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Abstract: In this study, we analyze the firm’s choice of legal form of organization (“LFO”). We find that 
only  about  one in  three  firms  begins  operations  as a  proprietorship,  while  almost  as  many  begin  as 
limited-liability companies and as corporations. Moreover, this distribution is remarkably stable over the 
first four years of the firm’s life. Fewer than one in ten firms changes LFO during its first four years. 
Those  that  do  change  LFO  disproportionately  move  to  a  more  complex  form,  primarily  from 
proprietorship to a form with limited liability. Our analysis of the firm’s initial choice of LFO reveals that 
a firm is more likely to choose a more complex LFO when the firm is more complex as proxied by 
employment size, by offering more complex employee benefit plans, and by offering trade credit. A more 
complex initial LFO also is more likely when the firm is more highly levered and when its primary owner 
is more educated; but is less likely when the firm is more profitable, has more tangible assets, uses 
personal loans for firm financing and when its primary owner is female. Our analysis of the decision to 
change  LFO  finds  that  firms  initially  organized  as  LLCs  or  S-corporations  are  less  likely,  while 
Partnerships  are  more  likely,  to  change  LFO  than  are  Proprietorships  or  C-corporations.  Firms  that 
increase employment or change location between a residence and rented/ purchased space, are more likely 
to change LFO, as are smaller and more profitable firms. Firms that experience a change in the number of 
owners  (up  or  down),  a  decrease  in  the  ownership  of  the  primary  owner  or  a  change  in  industrial 
classification are more likely to change LFO. Of those firms changing LFO, the choice of a more complex 
LFO is more likely when the firm has changed location, experienced an increase in the number of owners 
or the ownership share of the primary owner, but is less likely when the firm has experienced a decrease 
in the number of owners. 
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How Do Firms Choose Legal Form of Organization? 
 
1. Introduction 
  Why do entrepreneurial firms initially choose one organizational form over another? 
When and why do entrepreneurial firms change organizational form, switching, for example, 
from proprietorship to partnership, LLC or corporation? Do firms grow more quickly under one 
form of organization than another? These are three fundamental questions about entrepreneurial 
firms that have largely gone unanswered because the data needed to provide answers did not 
exist. 
  With release of the initial Kauffman Firm Survey (“KFS”) and its first four annual 
follow-ups, this situation has changed. The KFS tracks a panel of 4,928 new businesses 
established during 2004, providing information about the firm in the year of its inception and, for 
those firms that survive, providing information about the firm in each of four subsequent years—
2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008. It will continue to track these firms for three additional years (2009, 
2010 and 2011).  
  Because the KFS collects information on each firm’s legal form of organization (“LFO”) 
in each survey year, researchers can use KFS data to identify firms that change their LFO and 
then to analyze why the owners of these firms choose to make these changes. The financial life-
cycle theory of the firm tells us that a firm typically starts out as a proprietorship, which is the 
simplest LFO. As a firm grows larger, more complex and needs more capital than is available 
from the proprietor, the proprietor can choose to change the firm’s LFO to a partnership, legal 
liability company, S-corporation or C-corporation. Each of these alternatives enables the firm to 
raise capital from outside investors, funds for growth that are unavailable to a proprietorship. 
However, each of these alternatives involves trade-offs in costs and benefits.   - 2 - 
  Our analysis reveals that, surprisingly, a firm’s choice of LFO is largely set in stone at 
inception, in contradiction to the life-cycle theory of the firm. Only about one in three firms 
begins life as a proprietorship, while almost as many begin as limited-liability companies 
(“LLCs”) and as corporations. Moreover, this distribution is remarkably stable over the first four 
years of a firm’s life. Fewer than one in ten firms changes LFO during these first four years, but 
those that do disproportionately move to a more complex form, primarily from proprietorship to 
a form with limited liability. So, at least for those firms that do change LFO, we do find support 
for the life-cycle theory. 
  Our analysis of the firm’s initial choice of LFO reveals that a firm is more likely to 
choose a more complex LFO when the firm is more complex as proxied by employment size, by 
offering more complex employee benefit plans, and by offering trade credit. A more complex 
initial LFO also is more likely when the firm is more highly levered and when its primary owner 
is more educated; but is less likely when the firm is more profitable, has more tangible assets, 
uses personal loans for firm financing and when its primary owner is female. 
  Our analysis of the decision to change LFO finds that firms initially organized as LLCs 
or S-corporations are less likely, while Partnerships are more likely, to change LFO than are 
Proprietorships or C-corporations. Firms that increase employment or change location between a 
residence and rented/ purchased space, are more likely to change LFO, as are smaller and more 
profitable firms. Firms that experience a change in the number of owners (up or down), a 
decrease in the ownership of the primary owner or a change in industrial classification are more 
likely to change LFO.  
For those firms that do change LFO, this decision is primarily driven by changes in 
ownership structure. The choice of a more complex LFO is more likely when the firm has   - 3 - 
changed location, experienced an increase in the number of owners or the ownership share of the 
primary owner, but is less likely when the firm has experienced a decrease in the number of 
owners. 
  This study makes important contributions to the literature on entrepreneurship by 
providing new empirical evidence on (i) a firm’s initial choice of LFO at start-up; (ii) the 
determinants of a firm’s initial choice of LFO; (iii) the incidence of changes in LFO during the 
start-years of a new firm; (iv) the determinant of changes in LFO during the start-up years of a 
new firm; and (v) differences in growth across organizational forms. 
  From a policy perspective, this new evidence provides policymakers with a roadmap by 
which they can encourage the transition of firms to organizational forms that are more conducive 
to growth and complexity. By targeting such policies towards high-tech firms, for example, 
policymakers can encourage such transitions in particular industries, or at firms with particular 
attributes, such as a small number of employees or at particular LFOs, such as proprietorships, 
which account for the largest share of start-ups. 
 
2. Legal Forms of Organization 
  Obviously, there are advantages and disadvantages to each organizational form and the 
entrepreneur must calculate the costs and benefits of these advantages and disadvantages. We 
explore these tradeoffs below. 
2.1 Proprietorship 
  The proprietorship is the simplest LFO—one that has no separate legal existence from its 
owner. A proprietorship is simply a person operating a business under her own name or a trade 
name (“doing business as”). In general, there are no legal requirements to operate a   - 4 - 
proprietorship. As a consequence, the law treats the legal obligations of the proprietorship as 
those of the owner. Also, because there is no separate legal entity, the profits and losses of the 
business flow through to the owner, as do any legal liabilities. The owner is personally 
responsible for all legal obligations of the firm and her personal wealth is at risk. A 
proprietorship can consist of, at most, two persons—a husband and wife filing a joint tax return. 
Otherwise, a proprietorship has only one owner, and, therefore, is limited in the amount of equity 
capital by the personal wealth of the proprietor. The life of a proprietorship is limited by the life 
of the proprietor; the firm dies with the owner. Finally, partial ownership shares do not exist for a 
proprietorship; the firm must be bought or sold in its entirety. 
2.2 Partnership 
  In order to deal with many of the limitations imposed by the proprietorship LFO, the 
partnership was established as a legal business entity whereby a group of two or more persons 
enter into a legal contract in which the partners agree to operate a business and share the profits 
from that business. There must be at least one general partner, who bears unlimited legal liability 
for the firm’s legal obligations, and there may be one or more limited partners, who enjoy limited 
liability if they do not materially participate in the operation of the business. The partnership 
enables a firm to raise equity capital in excess of that of a single owner; the equity in a 
partnership is limited by the combined personal wealth of all partners. As will a proprietorship, 
the profits and losses of the firm pass through the firm to the partners, but on a pro rata share 
based upon the partnership agreement. As with a proprietorship, there is a limitation on the life 
of a partnership; it ends with the death of the last general partner. However, ownership of a 
partnership is divided into shares that can be bought or sold.   - 5 - 
2.3 Corporation  
  A corporation is the most complex LFO. A corporation is a separate legal entity from its owner 
and, as such, is recognized as a “legal person” that can enter into contracts and enjoys all the legal rights 
of a “natural person.” Consequently, all owners of a corporation enjoy limited liability. In sharp contrast 
to a proprietorship and partnership, a corporation enjoys an unlimited life. There are two primary types of 
corporations in the U.S.—the C-corporation and the S-corporation.   
2.31 C-corporation 
C-corporations are subject to corporate income tax at both federal and state levels. Any 
earnings distributed to shareholders as dividends are subject to a second level of taxation at 
personal income tax rates.  Although this double tax often is cited as a reason not to conduct 
business as a C-corporation, it is just one factor to consider. Others may outweigh it, and careful 
tax planning can minimize this disadvantage. 
  One way the corporation can reduce the double taxation of corporate income is to pay 
large salaries to shareholders who are managers or employees of the firm. Because compensation 
is a valid business expense, a C-corporation can deduct compensation in its calculation of taxable 
income, avoiding the corporate tax on these distributions.  However, the IRS imposes limitations 
on this practice by setting rules on what is considered reasonable compensation; excessive 
compensation can be reclassified by the IRS as a dividend distribution that is subject to the 
corporate tax plus penalties.   
  C-corporation shareholders may postpone the double tax if earnings are reinvested in the 
business rather than paid as dividends. In this case, retained earnings are taxed only at the 
corporate level. The amount of earnings retained, however, is effectively limited by the 
accumulated earnings tax. It also is important to remember that shareholders will pay tax if the 
earnings eventually are distributed or if corporate assets are sold and the corporation liquidated.   - 6 - 
When corporate assets are sold, shareholders will pay a capital gains tax on the proceeds 
of the sale.  If a tax-free exchange of stock occurs instead of a sale, owners will not pay tax 
unless they sell some of the shares received in the exchange.  States generally do not offer 
favorable rates on capital gains. 
Because some state corporate income tax rates are higher than individual rates, a business 
organized as a regular corporation may pay higher state taxes than if it is organized as a 
partnership or S-corporation. However, this difference may not be significant in the few states 
that tax unincorporated businesses. 
2.32 S-corporations 
An S-corporation is a firm that elects special tax status as defined by Subchapter S of the 
Internal Revenue Code.  The S-corporation was created in 1958 to provide tax relief primarily to 
small privately held firms. An S-corporation requires the same corporate formalities as a 
C-corporation, including articles of incorporation, a board of directors, an annual shareholders’ 
meeting, corporate minutes and shareholder votes on major corporate decisions.   
S-corporations are subject to a number of restrictions that do not apply to C-corporations, 
including a limit to one class of stock and a limit on the number of shareholders. Originally, this 
shareholder limit was set at 10, but subsequently was raised to 15 in 1976, to 25 in 1981, to 35 in 
1982, to 75 in 1996 and to 100 in 2004.  Both new and existing corporations may elect 
S-corporation status. 
The major difference between a C-corporation and an S-corporation is that S-corporation 
income “passes through” to its shareholders so that it is subject to a single level of taxation—at 
the personal level.  Its income, whether or not distributed, is passed through to shareholders on a 
pro rata basis and included on their individual tax returns.  Because an S-corporation passes   - 7 - 
through its income to its shareholders, it avoids the double taxation of corporate income suffered 
by C-corporations.  As a general rule, the higher is the percentage of corporate income to be 
distributed, the more beneficial is the S election. The S-corporation form is beneficial for an 
existing profit-making corporation that does not reinvest earnings, or cannot do so because of an 
accumulated earnings problem, and expects to distribute substantially all of its income to 
shareholders.  For an ongoing business that anticipates an accumulated earnings problem, an 
S-corporation election may be beneficial, at least during the interim period when earnings are 
distributed. 
  Some C-corporations avoid double taxation by paying out salaries and bonuses large 
enough to reduce corporate net income to zero.  The IRS may challenge such compensation as 
excessive and reclassify part of the compensation as a nondeductible dividend.  A business 
effectively can eliminate the possibility of excessive compensation disputes with the IRS by 
electing S-corporation status.   
In contrast to their C-corporation counterparts, shareholder-managers of S-corporations 
have incentive to favor dividend distributions over managerial compensation. This result obtains 
because salary income is subject to a 15.3% payroll withholding tax mandated by the Federal 
Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), which funds the Social Security (12.4%) and Medicare 
(2.9%) social insurance programs. Dividend distributions are not subject to the FICA tax, so a 
shareholder manager avoids the payroll tax to the extent she can shift income from salary to 
dividends. After the Tax Reform Act of 1982, both salaries and dividends were treated as 
ordinary personal income, which was subject to federal and state personal income taxes. 
However, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Act of 2003 set the federal personal-income tax rate 
on qualified dividends at 15% rather than at the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate on ordinary income.   - 8 - 
This increased the incentive of a shareholder-manager in a high tax bracket to shift salary income 
to dividends. Not only would the dividend income avoid the payroll taxes, it also would be taxed 
at a lower rate than ordinary income, which includes salary. 
For the most part, the incentive to shift salary income to dividends applies only to 
manager-shareholders earning less than the Social Security Wage Base, which was $60,600 in 
the early 1990s, but is indexed to inflation and, subsequently, has increased to $106,800 as of tax 
year 2009. Salary income above this cap is subject only to the Medicare Hospital Insurance 
portion of FICA, which is only 2.9%.  
The IRS imposes a requirement of “reasonable compensation” at S-corporations to limit 
avoidance of the payroll tax just as it imposes a requirement at C-corporations to limit avoidance 
of the corporate tax. Manager-shareholders must pay themselves a “reasonable” salary based 
upon what comparable non-shareholder managers working comparable hours are paid at other 
firms of similar size operating in the same industry.  The IRS may reclassify dividends as salary 
if it deems managerial compensation to be “unreasonably” low. This has led many accounting 
firms to recommend a “60/40” rule: pay out at least 60% of earnings as salary and only 40% as 
dividends.  
Most states follow the federal example, exempting S-corporations from the corporate 
income tax. However, some states, most notably California and New York, recognize the 
pass-through nature of S-corporations but still impose a tax at the entity level. Others do not 
recognize S status and treat all corporations operating in their jurisdictions as regular 
corporations, subjecting the entity to a corporate tax and its shareholders to a personal income 
tax on any dividends received from the corporation.   - 9 - 
The S-corporation provides a significant advantage over a regular corporation if a 
business is operating at a loss, particularly if most or all of the owners are in the highest tax 
brackets.  If the losses are not generated by passive activities, shareholders can use those losses 
to shelter other personal income. 
In contrast, the C-corporation does not provide an immediate tax benefit from operating 
losses unless it can use an optional provision permitting carry-back of losses against profits 
during the three most recent tax years.  However, if a new business loses money in the first years 
of operation, the carry-back provision does not provide any current benefit. Losses not used in 
the current tax year or carried back can be carried forward and used to offset profits in future 
years, but several years may pass before the firm’s profits are large enough to realize the full tax 
benefit of the early losses. 
2.4 Limited-Liability Company 
  The limited-liability company (“LLC”) is a relatively new business structure allowed 
under most state laws, but not recognized as an LFO by the IRS, that is, in essence, a hybrid 
between the partnership and the S-corporation. Owners of an LLC enjoy limited liability, ease of 
transfer of ownership shares, pass-through of income to the owners, and less administrative 
burden than faced by owners of a corporation. For example, an LLC is not required to have a 
board of directors or officers, and, typically, is required to file much less burdensome paperwork 
with the government. However, like a corporation and unlike a partnership, an LLC enjoys an 
unlimited life. 
Many of the LLC’s disadvantages arise from its short history. Some states do not treat 
LLCs as offering limited liability, and some lenders may be hesitant to lend to an LLC because 
of difficulty in determining who actually has the authority to enter into a contract on behalf of   - 10 - 
the LLC. For federal tax purposes, an LLC must choose to be treated as a partnership, a 
corporation, or, for single-owners, a proprietorship.
1 
 
3. Literature Review 
The literature on determinants of LFO is extremely sparse because, as previously noted, 
there was no suitable source of data for analyzing this issue prior to the KFS. Consequently, most 
of the literature on organizational form is theoretical, dating back to Adam Smith (1776). Much 
of this theory focuses on finances and human resources. Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b), Jensen (1983),Williams (1985) and others 
point to the separation of ownership and control and control mechanisms such as the board of 
directors that have evolved to limit agency costs as one of the reasons why most large firms are 
organized as C-corporations. 
Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) argue that firms choose their organizational form base 
upon a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of financial risks and decision making. As firms 
grow larger and more complex, corporations become more efficient relative to proprietorships 
because the owner must be wealthy enough to bear all of the firm’s financial risk as well as 
possess the expertise to run the firm. Separating financing from control enables the firm to 
operate more efficiently by allowing separate persons to specialize in bearing risk and managing 
the firm. The cost of this separation is the divergence of interests between owners and managers 
so that corporations must develop governance mechanisms for minimizing these agency costs. 
Allen and Sherer (1995) develop a theory of organizational form where the proprietorship 
fosters quality, whereas the corporation fosters efficiency. Proprietors are tied to their firm 
                                                       
1 For more information on the tax treatment of LLCs, go to the IRS website: 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=98277,00.html    - 11 - 
through both their financial and human capital, so that they suffer directly the consequences of 
poor quality. Corporate managers, on the other hand, are not tied to the firm by their financial 
resources. Consequently, Allen and Scherer’s theory predicts that corporations will be the 
dominant form for firms that can guarantee quality in ways other than the dedication of the 
owner, such as through the provision of warranties. 
Easterbrook and Fischel (1985) argue that most of the advantages of corporation, 
including limited liability, can be achieved by proprietorships and partnerships through 
contracting with their customers, creditors and suppliers, so that the corporation is largely 
irrelevant. 
Another group of papers, including Harberger (1966), Shoven (1976), Ballard et al. 
(1985), Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1988, 1989, 1993), Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1990, 1994, 
1997) and Goolsbee (1998, 2004),  focus on taxes as the key issue in choosing organizational 
form. In the U.S., C-corporations are taxed at a different, higher rate than other LFOs, so taxes 
are expected to influence a firm’s organizational decision, inducing them to shift out of the C-
corporate form. Goolsbee (2004), for example, exploits cross-sectional variation in corporate 
taxes at the state level to explore this issue. He finds strong evidence that higher corporate tax 
rates reduce the incidence of C-corporations relative to other LFOs. 
A couple of more recent empirical studies look at organizational form and firm growth. 
Harhoff et al. (1998) analyze a sample of 11,000 firms in Germany and find that incorporated 
firms grow faster than unincorporated firms. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2006) analyze a cross-
sectional sample of firms from 52 countries and find that the incidence of corporations is higher 
in countries with higher measures of corporate governance and that incorporated firms grow 
faster than unincorporated firms in countries with better corporate governance.   - 12 - 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data 
4.11 The KFS 
  Our study uses data from the Kauffman Firm Survey (“KFS”). The KFS tracks a panel of 
4,928 new businesses established during 2004, providing information about the firm in the year 
of its inception and, for those firms that survive, providing information about the firm in each 
subsequent year. As of year-end 2010, data were available for four follow-up samples, providing 
information for 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008, as well as the initial year of 2004. In addition, the 
KFS has received funding to continue tracking these firms for three additional years—2009, 
2010 and 2011. The KFS is the largest longitudinal database on new businesses ever created, and 
the most comprehensive longitudinal database on small U.S. firms of which we are aware. 
  Like the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Small Business Finances (“SSBF”), the KFS 
uses the Dun & Bradstreet (“D&B”) database as a sampling frame, selecting a stratified random 
sample of 4,928 firms from the frame of approximately 258,000 firms that started during 2004. 
High-tech firms were oversampled, while wholly-owned subsidiaries of existing firms, inherited 
businesses and not-for-profit firms were excluded from the sampling frame. The initial survey 
was conducted between July 2005 and July 2006 using a computer-assisted telephone interview 
(“CATI”) with the principal of the firm. In an attempt to improve response rates, respondents 
were paid $50 for a complete interview. The weighted response rate for the initial survey was 
43%. 
  To be eligible for the initial survey, a firm had to report in the affirmative to having 
performed one of the following during 2004, but performed none of the four during prior years:  
(i) paid state unemployment taxes; (ii) paid FICA taxes; (iii) used an employer Identification 
Number (EIN); or (iv) used Schedule C to report business income on a personal tax return.   - 13 - 
  The first follow-up survey was conducted during June 2006 - January 2007, resulting in 
3,998 complete interviews and identifying 369 firms as out-of-business. This translates into a 
weighted response rate of 88%.  
  The second follow-up survey was conducted during May - December 2007; 3,390 firms 
completed the second follow-up, which identified 777 firms as out-of-business, including 369 
identified during the first follow-up. This translates into a weighted response rate of 82%.   
  The third follow-up survey was conducted during June - December 2008, and obtained 
2,915 complete interviews for a response rate of 78%. During the third follow-up, 1,171 firms 
were identified as out of business, including 635 identified during the first or second follow-ups. 
  The fourth follow-up survey was conducted during June – December 2009 and obtained 
2,606 complete interviews for a weighted response rate of 83%. During the four follow-ups, a 
total of 1,483 firms were identified as permanently out of business, including 1,124 identified 
during the first three follow-ups. 
  The KFS is ideal for this study. Unlike the SSBF, it captures a firm’s initial decision to 
choose an organizational form. This enables us to model the firm’s decision as a function of 
variables pre-dating the decision. In addition, the KFS tracks the firm’s organizational form over 
time, enabling us to identify firms that change organizational after their initial formation. This 
enables us to model the firm’s decision to change organizational form and, conditional on that 
decision, to model its choice of a more, or less, complex organizational form. 
4.12 Analysis Variables 
Our primary variable of interest is the firm’s legal form of organization. For the initial 
survey and each follow-up, the KFS includes information on each firm’s LFO as of that point in   - 14 - 
time. Hence, we can use this information both to identify initial LFO and to identify subsequent 
changes in LFO. 
For explanatory variables, we utilize information from the KFS about the characteristics 
of each firm and each firm’s primary owner. We are primarily interested in measures of firm 
complexity, as the life-cycle theory posits that firms change to more complex LFOs as they grow 
more complex over time. The KFS provides information on seven legal forms of organization: 
Proprietorship, General Partnership, Limited Partnership, Limited Liability Company (“LLC”), 
S-corporation, C-corporation and Other. We collapse the number of LFOs to five in order to 
make our analysis more tractable by deleting 14 firms that reported “other” as their initial LFO, 
and by combining firms that reported that they were general partnerships or limited partnerships 
into a single partnership category. We follow convention in ordering organizational forms by 
complexity with Proprietorship being the simplest, followed by Partnership, LLC, S-corporation 
and, as most complex, C-corporation. 
We include two measures of firm size: total employment and a categorical representation 
of total assets.
2 Total employment is simply the number of firm employees as of the survey’s 
reference year. It is important to note that over half of the firms report zero employees. This is 
because the owner(s) of a firm is not necessarily an employee of the firm. When a firm hires its 
first employee, it becomes much more complex, especially from a tax viewpoint. The firm must 
begin keeping records of salary expense, withholding FICA taxes and paying state 
unemployment taxes. Consequently, we expect that total employment should be positively 
related to complexity of LFO.  
                                                       
2 Unlike the SSBF, the KFS does not provide imputed values for missing information. Instead, 
the KFS collected information on ranges of values when the respondent refused to supply an 
actual value for a continuous variable.   - 15 - 
Total assets, like most of the variables denominated in dollars, is only reported in a 
categorical format. There are nine ranges of value: “0” for zero dollars; “1” for $500 or less; “2” 
for $501- $1,000; “3” for $1,001 - $3,000; “4” for $3,001 - $5,000; “5” for $5,001 - $10,000; “6” 
for $10,001 - $25,000; “7” for $25,001 - $100,000; “8” for $100,001 - $1 million; and “9” for 
more than $1 million. Typically, a firm’s complexity on a wide range of dimensions grows with 
the value of total assets, so we view asset size as a generic measure of firm complexity and 
expect that it should be positively related to complexity of LFO. 
We include a single measure of profitability in our model, but this measure is constructed 
from three KFS variables: an indicator for whether the firm was operating at a profit or loss, and 
two categorical range indicators for the amount of profit or loss, where the ranges are the same as 
defined for total assets. This results in a profitability measure with a range of values from -9 to 
+9. We expect a negative relation between profitability and complexity of LFO because we 
expect that more complex start-ups are associated with greater start-up costs and longer periods 
of time until output can be ramped up and customers brought on board; consequently, they are 
more likely to incur larger losses from which the owners would like to be protected by the 
limited liability offered by more complex LFOs. 
As a related variable, we include a dummy variable indicating positive sales. We expect 
that a more complex firm takes longer to generate initial output and bring customers on board 
resulting in any sales revenues, so we expect a negative relation between positive sales and 
complexity of LFO. 
We include a series of six dummy variables that indicate whether or not the firm reported 
having any amount of six categories of assets: Accounts Receivable, Inventory, Equipment, 
Vehicles, Land/Buildings, and Other Assets; we exclude the seventh category, which is Cash.   - 16 - 
Within this set of variables, we are primarily interested in Accounts Receivable and Other 
Assets. A firm with a positive value of Accounts Receivable is a firm that is offering trade credit 
to its customers. By functioning as a financial intermediary, as well as performing its primary 
function, the firm, by definition, is more complex and more likely to choose an LFO offering 
limited liability in order to protect the personal assets of the owner. We are interested in Other 
Assets because this category includes intangible assets. A firm reporting intangible assets, such 
as patents or trademarks, is more complex than a firm with standard assets, such as inventory and 
equipment, and is hypothesized to be more likely to choose a more complex LFO. We expect 
that a firm with more standard assets, including inventory and equipment, would be less likely to 
choose more complex LFO. 
From information on how the firm is financed, we include total liabilities (in the standard 
KFS nine-category range format) and a dummy variable indicating whether the firm obtained 
personal loans for the purpose of financing the firm from (1) personal credit cards, (2) personal 
bank loans, or (3) personal loans from family and friends. Here, our focus is on limited liability 
rather than complexity; we expect that a firm with limited liability will be more likely to rely 
upon debt than equity and less likely to rely upon personal credit than business credit. 
Consequently, we expect that complexity of LFO will be positively related to total liabilities and 
negatively related to the use of personal loans for business financing. 
We include two measures of employee benefits as proxies for firm complexity: dummy 
variables indicating whether or not the firm provided health care or a retirement plan for 
employees. As proxies for firm complexity, we expect each to be positively related to complexity 
of LFO.   - 17 - 
We include a single measure of firm location as a proxy for firm complexity—a dummy 
variable indicating that the firm was located in the personal residence of the firm’s owner. While 
there were five categories for location (residence, rental, purchased space, client’s space, other 
space), more than 90 percent of the firms responded that they were either in a residence or a 
rental space, so we combine the last four categories into “other than residence” and collapse this 
into a binary variable. We expect that more complex firms would seek space outside of the 
owner’s residence; consequently, we expect a negative relation between organizational 
complexity and residential location. 
Finally, as control variables, we include a set of 15 dummy variables for industrial 
classification based upon two-digit NAICS code: Agriculture (10); Construction (21, 22, 23); 
Manufacturing (31, 32, 33); Wholesale Trade (42); Retail Trade (44, 45); Transportation (48, 
49); Information Services (51); Finance (52); Real Estate (53); Professional Services (54, 55, 
61); Business Services (56); Health Services (62); Arts & Entertainment (71); Food Services 
(72); and Other Services (81). 
  From information on the primary owner of the firm, we include a series of variables that 
provide information on the age, education, experience, race, ethnicity and gender. Age is a range 
variable with seven categories: “1” for 18-24 years; “2” for 25-34; “3” for 35-44; “4” for 45-54; 
“5” for 55-64; “6” for 65-75; and “7” for 75 or more years. Experience is simply in years. 
Education is a range of ten categories that we collapse into four: High School or less; Some 
College; College Degree; and Graduate Degree. Race, ethnicity and gender are binary indicator 
variables; there are four categories of race—Asian, Black, White, and Other. We expect that 
older, better educated and more experienced primary owners will choose more complex LFOs. 
We have no expectations regarding race, ethnicity and gender, but include these as general   - 18 - 
control variables. Finally, we include a variable that indicates whether or not the primary owner 
is an employee of the firm. We expect that owners only become employees when the firm is 
more complex so we expect a positive relation with complexity of LFO. 
4.2 Methodology 
Our study uses the following research design. First, we model the firm’s initial decision 
to choose a legal form of organization using a multinomial logistic-regression model, where the 
dependent variable takes on one of five values—one for each organizational form: 
Proprietorship, Partnership, LLC, S-corporation or C-corporation. 
Initial LFO i =  
f (Firm Characteristics i, Owner Characteristics i, Industrial Classification i)   (1) 
Where: 
Initial LFO i is an indicator variable for organizational form for firm i that takes on a  
    value of 1 through 5, with each value corresponding to one organizational form in 
    the order of increasing complexity: Proprietorship, Partnership, LLC,    
    S-corporation and C-corporation.  
Firm Characteristics i is a vector including location, financing and ownership structure, 
  business strategy, income and expenses, assets and liabilities. These variables are 
  defined in Panel A of Appendix Table 1. 
Owner Characteristics i is a vector including information on the primary owner, 
  including race, gender, ethnicity, age, experience, and education. These variables 
  are defined in Panel B of Appendix Table 1. 
Industrial Classification i) is a vector of 15 dummy variables indicating industrial 
  classification based upon two-digit NAICS code.   - 19 - 
For the firm’s subsequent decision to change organizational form, we estimate the 
following selection model:  
Change LFO i, t =  
f (Firm Characteristics i , Owner Characteristics i , Industrial Classification i)  (2) 
Where: 
Change LFO i, t is a binary indicator variable that takes on a value of one if firm i changed 
  legal form of organization form during year t, and zero otherwise. 
  Firm Characteristics i and Owner Characteristics i and Industrial Classification i) are  
    vectors of explanatory variables as described above and defined in Appendix  
    Table 1. However, we augment those variables with several related variables that 
  measure changes in these characteristics from the base year to the fourth follow-up. 
  These include change in employment, change in industry, change in the number of 
  owners and change in location of the firm. 
Conditional upon the selection model (using the standard model of Heckman (1979)), we 
estimate the following logistic regression model:
3 
More Complex LFO i, t =  
f (Firm Characteristics i , Owner Characteristic i , Industrial Classification i))   (3) 
where: 
More Complex LFO i, t is a binary indicator variable for the new organizational form for 
  firm i in year t that takes on a value of one if the firm moved to a more complex 
  LFO and zero if the firm moved to a less complex LFO. 
                                                       
3 We also attempted to estimate a multinomial logit model analyzing determinants of which new 
LFO was chosen, but there are too few observations to obtain meaningful results for the five 
categories.   - 20 - 
  Firm Characteristics i and Owner Characteristics i and Industrial Classification i are  
    vectors of explanatory variables as described above and defined in Appendix  
    Table 1. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Choices of and Changes in Legal Form of Organization 
  Table 1 presents information on the choices of legal form of organization recorded by the 
initial Kauffman Firm Survey and each of the four currently available follow-ups. Perhaps the 
most surprising finding from this table is that only 35.76 percent of firms newly established in 
2004 chose the simplest legal form of organization—the proprietorship. The life-cycle theory of 
the firm suggests that the vast majority of new firms should begin life as proprietorships. 
  Also surprising is the finding that 30.50 percent chose to organize as LLCs. This suggests 
a relatively high level of financial sophistication among this latter group of firms, as the LLC is a 
relatively new legal form of organization, becoming mainstream only in the past two decades. By 
comparison, in the 2003 SSBF, less than ten percent of surveyed small firms reported organizing 
as LLCs. The incidence among 2004 start-ups is more than three times as high.  
  S-corporations account for 20.14 percent of the 2004 start-ups as compared with more 
than 30 percent of small firms surveyed by the 2003 SSBF. C-corporations account for only 7.94 
percent of the 2004 startups, compared with more than 14 percent of the 2003 SSBF firms. In 
summary, there are significant differences in the LFO choices of 2004 start-ups relative to those 
of firms surveyed by the 2003 SSBF, which includes firms whose average age is about 14 years. 
  Also shown in Table 1 is the distribution by legal form of organization for follow-up 
surveys 1 through 4. At the bottom of Panel B is the total number of firms, which clearly shows   - 21 - 
the attrition in the sample—from 4,928 in 2004 to 3,998 in 2005; 3,469 in 2006; 2,971 in 2007; 
and 2,634 in 2008. This attrition is due in part to firms going out of business and in part to firms 
refusing to participate in the follow-up surveys. 
Another surprise is that the weighted distributions by LFO are relatively stable across the 
five surveys, but with a decline over time in proprietorships and an increase over time in both 
LLCs and S-corporations, consistent with the life-cycle theory of the firm. However, the 
percentage of C-corporations declines over time, which is inconsistent with the life-cycle theory. 
  Panels A through D of Appendix Table 1 present cross-tabulations of the distributions of 
KFS firms by legal organization in the initial survey relative to follow-up surveys. Only firms 
that changed LFO from one survey to the next are included in this table. Panel A of Appendix 
Table 1 shows that, from 2004 to 2005, a total of 148 firms changed LFO. Of this total, 63 
changed from proprietorship to a more complex LFO, and 15 changed from LLC to corporation. 
Among partnerships, 25 changed LFO, 10 to proprietorship, 6 to LLC, 7 to S-corporation and 2 
to C-corporation. Among S-corporations, 13 changed LFO, with six becoming C-corporations, 3 
becoming LLCs and 3 becoming proprietorships. Surprisingly, 26 C-corporations changed to less 
complex LFO, but primarily to S-corporation (23 0f 26).  
  Panel B of Appendix Table 1 shows that, from 2005 to 2006, a total of 108 firms changed 
LFO. Of this total, 48 proprietorships changed to a more complex LFO. Among LLCs, 24 
changed LFO, with 4 switching to the simpler proprietorships and 18 switching to the more 
complex S- or C-corporation. Among S-corporations, 15 changed LFO, with 2 switching to 
proprietorships, 5 to LLCs and 8 to C-corporation. Among C-corporations, 11 changed LFO, 
with 3 changing to LLC, 7 to S-corporation and 1 to Partnership. Among Partnerships, 10 
changed LFO, 5 to S-corporation, 3 to LLC and 2 to proprietorship.   - 22 - 
  Panel C of Appendix Table 1 shows that, from 2006 to 2007, a total of 68 firms changed 
LFO. Of this total, 30 proprietorships changed to a more complex LFO. Among LLCs, 14 
changed LFO, with 11 switching to more complex S- or C-corporations and only 2 to simpler 
proprietorships. Among S-corporations, 6 changed LFO, with 5 changing to more complex C-
corporations. Among C-corporations, 6 changed LFO, with 5 changing to S-corporation. Among 
Partnerships, 12 changed LFO, 3 to S-corporation, 4 to LLC and 5 to Proprietorship. 
  Panel D of Appendix Table 1 shows that, from 2007 to 2008, only 57 firms changed 
LFO. Of this total, 17 proprietorships changed to a more complex LFO. Among LLCs, 15 
changed LFO, with 8 switching to simpler proprietorship and 7 to more complex S- or C-
corporation. Among S-corporations, 12 changed LFO, with 4 changing to more complex C-
corporation and eight to simpler LLC or proprietorship. Among C-corporations, 8 changed LFO, 
with 6 changing to S-corporation and two to LLC. Among Partnerships, only 5 changed LFO, 4 
to proprietorship and one to LLC. 
  In summary, the incidence of changes to LFO declines each year and by more than can be 
explained by attrition to the sample; this suggests that the start-ups are moving towards their 
optimal LFOs as they grow older.  
In Table 2, we combine the year-by-year changes from Panels A through D of Appendix 
Table 1.  Here, we see that the total of 381 changes to LFO are dominated by 158 changes from 
Proprietorship to a more complex LFO, primarily to LLC (68 firms) and S-corporation (54 
firms). LLCs account for the next highest incidence of changes to LFO at 74 firms, with 52 
changing to more complex corporate organization and 19 changing to simpler proprietorships. 
Among partnerships, 51 changed LFO, with 21 going to proprietorship, 14 to LLC and 15 to 
S-corporation. Among S-corporations, only 46 changed LFO, with 23 going to more complex   - 23 - 
C-corporations, 4 going to less complex LLCs, and 8 going to the simple proprietorship. Among 
C-corporations, 51 changed LFO, with the vast majority (41) simplifying to S-corporations. Out 
of the total of 381 changes in LFO, 253 (66.4%) moved to more complex organizational forms 
and 128 (33.6%) moved to less complex organizational forms. In the remainder of the paper, we 
seek to explain why some firms choose to become more complex while others choose to become 
less complex.  
5.2 Descriptive Statistics for LFOs 
  In Table 3, we present descriptive statistics from the base year of 2004 for each of the 
five legal forms of organization. These statistics allow us to make univariate comparisons across 
the five LFOs. We start with firm characteristics in section 5.21, and then move on to owner 
characteristics in section 5.22, and to industrial classification in section 5.23. 
5.21 Firm Characteristics 
  Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for characteristics of the firm. Firm size 
as measured by total employment rises monotonically with firm complexity, from a low of 0.66 
at Proprietorships to 1.60 at Partnerships, 1.80 at LLCs, 2.70 at S-corporations and a high of 2.95 
at C-corporations.
4 A somewhat similar trend is observed for firm size as proxied by total assets, 
which, as noted in section 4.1, is reported in ranges rather than dollar values; however, asset size 
is greatest for S-corporations, followed by LLCs and then C-corporations.  
Base-year profitability, which also is measured in ranges rather than dollar values, is 
highest for Proprietorships and lowest for C-corporations. This finding is consistent with the 
expectation that start-up costs are higher for more complex firms. Similarly, positive base-year 
sales are most common at Proprietorships and least common among C-corporations. More 
                                                       
4 Not shown in Table 3 is the number of firms with no employees; only 42 percent of the firms 
report having at least one employee; 67% of proprietorship, 64% of partnerships, 60% of LLCs, 
44% of S-corporations and 43% of C-corporations report having zero employees.   - 24 - 
complex start-ups are often focused on developing new products during the first year of 
operation, while simpler firms begin serving customers immediately. 
  The next group of variables is a set of indicators for whether or not the firm reports 
having different types of assets on its balance sheet. Two out of three firms have cash on hand, 
but proprietorships are least likely (59%), whereas S-corporations most likely (73%), to have 
cash on hand. Two out of five firms report having inventory, with Partnerships (47%) and 
Proprietorships (42%) most likely and C-corporations (36%) and LLCs (36%) least likely. This 
is consistent with the finding for positive base year sales, as inventory is needed for selling a 
product (but not a service).  Fewer than two out of three firms report having equipment, with 
Partnerships least likely (63%) and S-corporations most likely (71%). One in four firms reports a 
vehicle on the balance sheet, with Partnerships again least likely (21%) and S-corporations most 
likely (28%). 
  Our two balance sheet variables of most interest are proxies for organizational 
complexity—Accounts Receivable and Other Assets. Just over a third of the firms report positive 
accounts receivable, indicating that they are suppliers of trade credit, with S-corporations (51%) 
and C-Corporations (43%) most likely and Partnerships (39%) and Proprietorships least likely 
(27%). Only 2% of all firms report Other Assets, but less than 1% of Proprietorships and 
Partnerships do so; in contrast, 4% of C-corporations report Other Assets, which include 
intangible assets such as patents and trademarks. 
  Among financing variables, the importance of limited liability is quite apparent. The 
average range value for total liabilities is 1.32, but the averages increase monotonically with 
complexity of LFO—from a low 0.66 at Proprietorships to a high of 2.25 at C-Corporations. Yet 
our indicator for owners who take out personal loans to finance the firm is highest for   - 25 - 
Proprietorships (59%) but lowest for C-corporations (50%) and Partnerships (49%); the overall 
average is 57%. 
  Our dummy variable for residential location is negatively related to organizational 
complexity, as hypothesized. Among Proprietorships, 63% choose to locate in a residence, 
whereas, among S- and C-corporations, only 37% and 35%, respectively, locate in a residence. 
  We also expect that more complex firms should be more likely to offer more 
comprehensive employee benefits. Consistent with this notion, we find that health plans for full-
time employees are offered by only 4.8% of Proprietorships but by 19.3% of C-corporations and 
24.0% of S-corporations. Similarly, retirement plans for full-time employees are offered by less 
than one percent of Proprietorships, but by more than eight percent of both S- and 
C-corporations. 
5.22 Owner Characteristics 
  Panel B of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for characteristics of the owners. The 
average number of owners is exactly 1.00 for proprietorships, but rises to 1.75 for 
S-corporations, 2.01 for LLCs, 2.47 for Partnerships and 2.94 for C-corporations, which is 
generally consistent with the growing complexity across these LFOs.  
  Both owner age and experience increase with complexity of the firm, as we expect. 
Experience of the primary owner is lowest for Proprietorships and highest for Corporations. Age 
of the primary owner, which is presented in ranges rather than actual number of years, is 
youngest for S-corporations and Proprietorships and oldest for C-corporations.  
By gender, female owners are least prevalent among C-corporations and most prevalent 
among Proprietorships and Partnerships. This is not surprising because previous studies of small 
businesses, such as Coleman and Robb (2009), Fairlie and Robb (2009), and Cole and Mehran   - 26 - 
(2010), have found that female owners are younger and less experienced than male owners; as 
noted above, both of these variables are positively related to complexity of LFO. 
  By race and ethnicity, minority-owned firms are disproportionately organized as 
C-corporations.  Black owners make up 9.2% of all primary owners, but account for 15.5% of 
primary owners at C-corporations and 11.0% of Proprietorships but only 5.3% of S-corporations. 
Similarly, Hispanics, which make up 6.3% of primary owners, are disproportionately represented 
at C-corporations (8.7%) and Proprietorships (8.2%). Asian owners are disproportionately found 
in C-corporations and least common among Proprietorships. While Asians make up 4.0% of all 
primary owners, they account for 7.4% of primary owners at C-corporations but only 3.0% at 
Proprietorships. White primary owners, which make up 82.2% of all primary owners, are more 
likely to be found at S-corporations (85.6%) and LLCs (85.2%) and least likely to be found at C-
corporations (73.2%).  
Organizational complexity appears to be correlated with the education of the primary 
owner.  Primary owners with a high-school degree or less are most likely to be found at 
Partnerships (31.8%) and Proprietorships (28.6%) and least likely among S-corporations (15.1%) 
and LLCs (15.5%). Primary owners with a college degree are most prevalent among 
Proprietorships (34.4%) and least prevalent among LLCs (26.7%). In contrast, primary owners 
with graduate degrees are least likely to be found at Proprietorships (16.8%) and most likely to 
be found at C-corporations (31.8%). At least at the extremes (high school and graduate degrees), 
the education of the primary owner appears to be highest among the most complex LFO (C-
corporations) and lowest among the least complex LFO (Proprietorships).   - 27 - 
5.23 Industrial Classification 
  In Panel C of Table 3 are descriptive statistics for our final set of variables—a set of 15 
indicators for industrial classification based upon two-digit NAICS codes. We expect to find 
sharp differences in organizational form across different industries, and the data bear out our 
expectations.  
  Professional-Services (NAICS 54, 55, 61) accounts for 17.1% of the population, but is 
over-represented among more complex LFOs (18.5% of LLCs, 17.3% of S-corporations and 
16.7% of C-corporations) relative to less complex LFOs (16.4% of Proprietorships and 12.7% of 
Partnerships).  
  Retail-Trade (NAICS 44, 45) accounts for 14.5% of the population, but is over-
represented among less complex LFOs (19.9% of Partnerships and 16.4% of Proprietorships) 
relative to more complex LFOs (11.9% of LLCs, 12.1% of C-corporations and 14.6% of S-
corporations).  
  Construction (NAICS 21, 22, 23) accounts for 11.5% of the population, but is over-
represented among S-corporations (14.3%) and under-represented among Partnerships (7.6%). 
  Business Services (NAICS 56) accounts for 9.9% of the population but is over-
represented among C-corporations (12.1%) and under-represented among Partnerships (8.0%). 
  Other Services (NAICS 81) accounts for 9.5% of the population, but is over-represented 
among less complex LFOs (15.0% of Proprietorships and 12.7% of Partnerships relative to more 
complex LFOs (6.4% of LLCs, 5.4% of C-corporations and 5.3% of S-corporations).  
  Manufacturing (NAICS 31, 32, 33) accounts for 6.4% of the population but is over-
represented among C-corporations (9.5%).    - 28 - 
  Finance (NAICS 52) accounts for 5.0% of the population, but is over-represented among 
more complex LFOs (7.4% of LLCs, 6.5% of S-corporations and 6.2% of C-corporations) 
relative to less complex LFOs (2.3% of Proprietorships and 0.8% of Partnerships).  
  There also are significant differences among the remaining industries that account for 
much smaller portions of the population. To summarize, we find wide variation in LFO across 
industries, as expected. 
5.3 Determinants of Initial LFO 
  Because so few firms change their LFO during the first four years, the most interesting 
analysis is looking at the determinants of the owner’s initial decision to organize her firm as one 
LFO rather than another. The results of this multinomial logistic-regression analysis appear in 
Table 4. This methodology produces (N – 1) coefficients for each explanatory variable, where N 
is the number of different values of the dependent variable; in our case N is equal to five, so we 
obtain four sets of coefficients. These coefficients measure the differential impact of that variable 
on each of the N – 1 outcomes of the dependent variable relative to an omitted category. For ease 
of interpretation, we have chosen the simplest form of legal organization—Proprietorship—as 
the omitted category. Consequently, the coefficients indicate whether each of the other four 
LFOs is more or less likely to be associated with that characteristic than is a Proprietorship. 
  For ease of interpretation, we also have calculated the odds ratio, whose interpretation 
(when multiplied by 100) is, for each variable, the percentage by which a firm with that 
characteristic is more or less likely to choose the LFO for that odds ratio rather than to choose to 
organize as a Proprietorship (the omitted category). Hence, for variables that proxy for more 
organizational complexity, our expectation is that odds ratios will be greater than one and higher   - 29 - 
for more complex LFOs; and for variables that proxy for less organizational complexity, our 
expectation is that odd ratios will be less than one and lower for more complex LFOs. 
  If we divide the odds ratio for one LFO by the odds ratio of another LFO for a given 
variable, we get the odds ratio for choosing the LFO in the numerator relative to the LFO in the 
denominator. Hence, we only need to present one set of results, rather than five, in order to be 
able to make comparisons between each pair of LFOs. 
5.31 Firm Characteristics and Initial LFO 
  Panel A of Table 4 presents the results for firm characteristics. For our primary measure 
of size—total employment—the odds ratio for each of the four included LFOs is greater than 1.0, 
and each of the four coefficients from which the odds ratios are calculated is statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level or better. This result is strongly supportive of our hypothesis that a 
larger firm is more complex and, therefore, is more likely to choose a more complex initial legal 
form of organization.  
  The ordering of the magnitudes of the odds ratios also fit our hypothesis that the “pecking 
order” of complexity runs from Proprietorship to Partnership, LLC, S-corporation and, finally, 
C-corporation. For a one-unit increase in total employment, a firm is 11% more likely to choose 
to organize as a partnership, 12% more likely to organize as an LLC, 12% more likely to 
organize as an S-corporation and 15% more likely to organize as a C-corporation than as a 
Proprietorship.  
  For each of our two measures of profitability—range of profits and an indicator for 
positive sales—the odds ratio for each of the four included LFOs is less than 1.0, and seven of 
the eight coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.01 level or better. These results are 
strongly supportive of our hypothesis that a more complex firm has greater startup costs and,   - 30 - 
consequently, is more likely to choose a more complex LFO with limited liability in order to 
shield its owners from firm early-years losses.  
  For a one-unit increase in range of profitability, a firm is (1.00 – 0.95 =) 5% less likely to 
choose to organize as a partnership, (1.00 – 0.95 =) 5% less likely to organize as an LLC, (1.00 – 
0.96 =) 4% less likely to organize as an S-corporation, and (1.000 – 0.93 =) 7% less likely to 
organize as a C-corporation than as a Proprietorship. Each of the four profitability-range 
coefficients is statistically significant at better than the 0.01 level.  
  A firm with positive sales is (1.00 – 0.88 =) 12% less likely to organize as a Partnership, 
(1.00 – 0.58 =) 42.0% less likely to organize as an LLC, (1.00 – 0.58 =) 42% less likely to 
organize as an S-corporation, and (1.00 – 0.30 =) 70% less likely to organize as a C-corporation 
than as a Proprietorship. Only the coefficient for Partnership lacks statistical significance at the 
0.01 level. 
  Our next set of variables are the two indicators for whether or not the firm reports two 
types of assets that proxy for firm complexity—Accounts Receivable and Other Assets. Seven of 
the eight odds ratios are greater than one and each of coefficients from which the odds ratios are 
calculated is statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better. These results support our 
hypothesis that firms reporting these two types of assets are more complex and hence more likely 
to choose a more complex LFO. The magnitude of the odds ratios indicate that firms reporting 
Accounts Receivable are almost 50% more likely to organize as LLCs, 61% more likely to 
organize as C-corporations, 62% more likely to organize as Partnerships, and 99% more likely to 
organize as S-corporations, than to organize as Proprietorships. Firms reporting Other Assets are 
two times as likely to organize as LLCs and S-corporations, and three times more likely to 
organize as C-corporations as to organize as Proprietorships (or Partnerships).   - 31 - 
  Our location variable, which indicates that the firm’s primary location is in a residence 
such as a house or garage, rather than in rented or purchased space, indicates that firms located in 
residences are significantly less likely to choose more complex LFOs, as each of the four 
coefficients is negative and statistically significant at better than the 0.01 level. The magnitudes 
indicate that such firms are 41% to 61% less likely to choose more complex LFOs, with 
C-corporation being the least likely choice. This supports our hypothesis that less complex firms 
locate in residences and hence, are more likely to choose less complex LFO. 
  Our two financing variables have the expected signs across LFOs. The positive 
coefficients for Total Liabilities indicate that firms with more debt in their capital structure are 
more likely to choose limited liability LFOs and the more debt, the more complex is the LFO 
chosen. Only the coefficient for Partnership lacks statistical significance at the 0.01 level. The 
magnitudes of the odds ratios increase with complexity of LFO, as hypothesized; lowest for 
partnerships at 1.05 and highest for C-corporations at 1.21. The dummy variable indicating that 
the primary owner took out personal loans to help finance the company has negative coefficients, 
as expected, and each is significant at the 0.05 level or better. However, the magnitude of the 
odds ratio is lowest for Partnerships at 0.55, but still is significantly less than one for the three 
more complex LFOs, indicating that firms whose owners choose to intermingle their personal 
and business finances (by using personal loans to finance the firm) are more likely to choose 
Proprietorship than other LFOs. 
  Coefficients for our two employee benefit variables have the expected positive signs 
across all LFOs and each is statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better. This supports our 
hypothesis that more complex firms (as proxied by offering health plans or retirement plans to 
full-time employees) are more likely to choose more complex LFOs. The odds ratios range from   - 32 - 
1.78 to 4.22, indicating that firms offering these benefits are two to more than four times more 
likely to organize as a more complex LFO than as a Proprietorship. 
  In summary, the results for firm characteristics chosen as proxies for firm complexity 
generally support our hypothesis that more complex firms choose more complex LFOs. 
5.32 Owner Characteristics and Initial LFO 
  Panel B of Table 4 presents the results for owner characteristics. Age and experience 
appear to play little role in the choice of initial LFO. Only one of the eight coefficients associated 
with these two variables is statistically significant at even the 0.10 level. That single coefficient, 
showing the effect of age on the odds of choosing to organize as an S-corporation, indicates that 
older owners are significantly less likely to organize as an S-corporation than as a Proprietorship. 
  Education, however, does appear to play an important role in the choice of initial LFO. In 
this specification, education is entered as a single variable that ranges from zero for a high-
school degree or less, to three for a graduate degree; rather than as three dummy variables. Each 
of the four coefficients on Education are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better. The 
odds ratios calculated from these coefficients indicate that a one unit increase in education 
reduces the odds of choosing a Partnership by 14%, but increases the odds of choosing a 
C-corporation, S-corporation and LLC by 31%, 33% and 43%, respectively. In other words, 
more education increases the likelihood that the primary owner will choose an initial LFO that is 
more complex and provides limited liability. 
Both gender and race appear to play an important role in choice of initial LFO. Three of 
the four coefficients for Female are negative and significant at the 0.05 level; only the coefficient 
for Partnership, which is positive, is insignificant. The odds ratios indicate that a Female primary 
owner is 25%, 18% and 30% less likely to choose to organize as an LLC, S-corporation and C-  - 33 - 
corporations, respectively. In other words, female primary owners are significantly less likely to 
choose an initial LFO that is more complex and provides limited liability. This finding is most 
interesting because we obtain this result in spite of controls for owner age and experience, which 
are correlated with both gender and choice of LFO; there are other aspects of female ownership 
that produce this result. This result also is consistent with Cole and Mehran (2010), who find that 
firms with female primary owners are significantly more likely to be organized as 
proprietorships and less likely to be organized as corporations. 
The results for the four dummy variables for primary owners who are Asian, Black, 
Hispanic, or Other Race indicate that race also plays a role in choice of initial LFO, but these 
results must be viewed with caution because of the small number of observations for these 
groups. Both Asian and Black primary owners are significantly more likely to choose to organize 
as a C-corporation relative to a Proprietorship. There are no other significant differences for 
Asian, but, for Black, the coefficients for both LLC and S-corporation are negative, indicating 
that Black primary owners are significantly less likely to choose either of these LFOs relative to 
Proprietorship. Hispanic primary owners are significantly less likely to choose to organize as 
Partnerships, LLCs and S-corporations than as Proprietorships. Primary owners of Other Races 
are significantly less likely to choose to organize as LLCs or S-corporations than as 
Proprietorships. In summary, the indicators for race show that primary owners of different races 
generally appear to favor organizing as the least complex or most complex LFO, rather than 
favor simpler or more complex LFOs. These findings are likely attributable to unobserved 
heterogeneity within these small sub-samples. 
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5.33 Industrial Classification and Initial Choice of LFO 
  In Panel C of Table 4 are the results for the 15 industrial classification indicator variables. 
In general, these results show wide variation in initial LFO across industries. 
  Firms in the both the Finance and Real Estate industries strongly favor any LFO other 
than Partnership as each of the four coefficients is positive and significant. The associated odds 
ratios indicate that Finance firms prefer more complex LFOs by a four-to-one ratio over 
Proprietorships, while Real Estate firms prefer LLCs, S-Corporations and C-corporations by a 
four-to-one ratio but Partnerships by only a two-to-one ratio over Proprietorships. 
  Firms in the both Construction and Business Services strongly favor more complex initial 
LFOs. Each of the coefficients for LLC, S-corporation and C-corporation is positive and 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The associated odds ratios indicate that a Construction 
firm is more than twice as likely to choose one of the more complex LFOs over Proprietorship or 
Partnership (which has a negative but insignificant coefficient); while a Business Services firm is 
only 50% – 150% more likely to do so. The results for Professional Services and Retail Trade are 
qualitatively similar to those for Business Services, in that they consistently favor more complex, 
limited liability LFOs. However, these relations are measured with less precision, as indicated by 
the lower t-statistics; only the coefficients for LLCs and C-corporations are statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level. 
  The only industry that consistently favors Proprietorship over the more complex LFOs is 
Other Services, but only the coefficients for LLCs and S-corporations are statistically significant. 
For the remaining industries, there is little relation with initial LFO.   - 35 - 
5.4 Growth in Employment 
  Next, we want to model the decision of the firm to change LFO from the form it initially 
chose at inception.  We expect that two of the most important determinants of this decision 
would be the initial legal form, with less complex organizational forms more likely to move to 
more complex organizational forms, and firm growth, with faster growing firms more likely to 
move to more complex organizational forms. We already have analyzed descriptive statistics for 
initial LFO, but not firm growth. In Table 5, we present descriptive statistics for employment 
growth from Year Zero (2004) to Years One (2005), Two (2006), Three (2007) and Four (2008).  
  Overall, the average change in employment from Year Zero is 1.16 in Year One, rises to 
1.51 in Year Two, falls to 1.41 in Year Three, and then rises to 1.47 in Year Four. When we 
compare employment growth by initial LFO, we find that partnerships, LLCs, S-corporations 
and C-corporations all grow faster than Proprietorships over each of the four periods with a 
single exception—LLCs grow slightly less fast from Year Zero to Year Three. We also note that 
C-corporations grow fastest across all four periods, at roughly double the rate of Proprietorships. 
S-corporations grow next fastest, and the differences between each type of Corporation and both 
Partnerships and LLCs are statistically significant across all four periods. In general, more 
complex LFOs exhibit greater growth in employment during each of the first four years of their 
lives. 
The statistics in Table 5 are based upon an unbalanced panel, as firms drop out of the 
KFS when they fail or when they refuse further to participate in follow-up iterations of the panel 
survey. The number of firms in the sample drops from 3,942 firms in year one to 2,635 firms in 
Year Four. Not shown in Table 5 are the results when we limit the analysis to firms that survived 
from Year Zero to Year Four. These results are not qualitatively different from the statistics   - 36 - 
shown in Table 5, except that Partnerships grow more slowly from Year Zero to Years Three and 
Four. 
5.5 Determinants of the Decision to Change LFO 
  Overall, we have 389 changes in LFO by 359 firms out of the 3,987 that made it through 
the fourth follow-up survey, indicating that change in LFO is a rare event, occurring at less than 
one in ten firms during the first four years of their lives. We cannot observe changes in legal 
form for the approximately one-thousand firms that failed or refused to participate in the fourth 
follow-up, so we exclude them from this analysis.  
  By initial LFO, 11.5% of proprietorships, 5.5% of LLCs, 24.5% of partnerships, 4.5% of 
S-corporations and 12.8% of C-corporations changed legal form at least once during their first 
four years. With the exception of LLCs and S-corporations, these differences are highly 
significant based upon a t-test for differences in means. 
 Next, we model this decision to change LFO using a binary logistic regression model 
where the dependent variable takes on a value of one if the firm changed LFO during the first 
four years and a value of zero otherwise. The results of this analysis appear in Table 6. 
5.51 Firm Characteristics and Changes in LFO 
  Panel A of Table 6 presents the results for the firm characteristics. Only three of the 
coefficients on the four included dummy variables for initial LFO are statistically significant. 
Coefficients on LLC and S-corporation are negative and significant, indicating that change in 
LFO is less likely for firms initially organized as LLCs and S-corporations, while the coefficient 
for Partnership is positive and significant, indicating that change in LFO is more likely for firms 
initially organized as Partnerships. The coefficient on C-corporation is negative, but lacks 
statistical significance. The odds ratios indicate that, relative to firms initially organized as   - 37 - 
Proprietorships, LLCs and S-corporations 73% and 83%, respectively, less likely to change LFO 
during their first four years of operations, while Partnerships are 55% more likely to do so.  
  The coefficient on change in employment is positive and significant, and its odds ratio 
indicates that a firm is 4% more likely to change LFO for each additional employee it hires 
during its first four years.  
  The coefficient on the initial level of employment is negative and significant, and its odds 
ratio indicates that a firm is 7% less likely to change LFO for each additional employee it had 
during its base year.  
  The coefficients on both Total Liabilities and Profit/Loss are positive, but only 
Profit/Loss is statistically significant; this indicates that more profitable firms are more likely to 
subsequently change LFO. 
  The next two variables measure changes in the firm’s location. Location Up indicates that 
a firm that began with its location in a residence moved to rented or owned space, while Location 
Down indicates that a firm that began with its location in rented or owned space moved to a 
residence. Coefficients on both variables are positive and significant, indicating that a firm that 
changed its location in either of these two manners was more likely to change LFO. 
  The final firm variable New Intellectual is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm 
had new intellectual property (patents, trademarks or copyrights) during its first four years. The 
coefficient on New Intellectual is positive but statistically insignificant. 
5.52 Owner Characteristics and Changes in LFO 
  Panel B of Table 6 presents the results for characteristics of the firm’s primary owner. 
Each of our indicators for race, ethnicity and gender is statistically insignificant. Owner Age is 
positive and significant, indicating that firms with older owners are less likely to change LFO.   - 38 - 
For each decade increment in age, a firm with an older owner is 20% less likely to change LFO. 
  The next three variables measure changes on ownership structure from the base year to 
the follow-up where the firm reported a change in LFO. Change % Ownership measures the 
change in the ownership share of the primary owner. The coefficient on this variable is negative 
and significant, and its odds ratio indicates that the likelihood of changing LFO decreases by one 
percent for each percentage point increase in initial ownership of the primary owner. 
  More Owners and Less Owners are two dummy variables indicating whether there was in 
an increase or decrease, respectively, in the number of firm owners. Both variables are positive 
and highly significant; their t-statistics are the highest of any explanatory variables, indicating 
that they are the most important factors explaining changes in LFO. The odds ratios associated 
with their coefficients indicate that a firm reporting a change in the number of owners is 
five-to-six times more likely to change LFO than a firm where the number of owners remains 
constant. 
5.53 Industrial Classification and Changes in LFO 
  Panel C of Table 6 presents the results for the industry dummy variables. Relative to the 
omitted category of Retail Trade firms, there are only two significant coefficients—for 
Construction and Real Estate. The odds ratio indicates that a Construction firm is 74% more 
likely, while a Real Estate firm is 65% less likely, to change LFO as is a Retail firm. The finding 
for Construction is likely related to the massive decline in construction employment that 
occurred as the housing bubble burst during 2007 – 2008. 
  Finally, we include Change NAICS, which is a dummy variable for a firm reporting a 
change in its NAICS code from the base year to follow-up year in which the firm also reported a 
change in its LFO. The coefficient on Change NAICS is positive and significant and its   - 39 - 
associated odds ratio indicates that a firm reporting a change in industrial classification is 80% 
more likely to change LFO. 
5.6 Determinants of the Decision to Change to a More Complex LFO 
  Finally, we analyze the firm’s decision to change to a more complex organizational form, 
conditional upon the firm’s decision to change organizational form. We use the binary logistic 
regression model from the previous section as the first stage of a Heckman two-stage bivariate 
probit selection model, where the second model is based upon a dependent variable that take on a 
value of one if the firm moved to a more complex LFO and a value of zero if it moved to a less 
complex LFO. For this test, we cannot include the initial LFO dummies because all 
proprietorships move to a more complex form while all C-corporations move to a less complex 
form. We also cannot include several of our dummy variables because all firms with these 
characteristics (which are Hispanic, Agriculture, and Real Estate) take on the same value for the 
dependent variable. The results of this analysis appear in Table 6.  
5.61 Firm Characteristic and the Decision to Change to a More Complex LFO 
  Panel A of Table 7 presents the results for firm characteristics. Five of the firm 
characteristics are statistically significant at the 0.10 level. Total Liabilities and Profit/Loss are 
both negative. The odds ratio indicates that a one-unit increase in total liabilities, which is 
measured in broad ranges, is associated with a 23% decrease, while a one-unit increase in 
profitability is associated with a 7% decrease, in the likelihood that a firm changing LFO will 
choose a more complex LFO. Health Plan, Location Up and Location Down are positive. A firm 
offering a health plan and changing LFO is nine times more likely to choose a more complex 
LFO. Firms changing LFO and moving from residential space to rented or owned space are 
twelve times more likely to choose a more complex LFO, while firms changing LFO and moving   - 40 - 
from rented or owned space to residential space are seven times more likely to choose a more 
complex LFO. 
5.62 Owner Characteristic and the Decision to Change to a More Complex LFO 
  In Panel B of Table 7 are the results for the owner characteristics. Not surprisingly, the 
two variables with the most explanatory power (as indicated by the highest t-statistics) are the 
dummies for More Owners and Less Owners. Of the firms changing LFO, those having more 
owners are significantly more likely to switch to a more complex LFO whereas those having less 
owners are significantly less likely to switch to a more complex LFO. The odds ratios indicate 
that firms with more owners are more than twelve times more likely, whereas firms with less 
owners are sixteen times less likely, to change to a more complex LFO. 
  The coefficients on both the Asian and Black dummies are negative and significant at the 
0.10 level, indicating that firms changing LFO and whose primary owners are Asian or Black are 
significantly less likely to change to a more complex LFO; the associated odds ratios indicate 
that they are more than 70% less likely to do so. This is not surprising, as we already had found 
in Table 3 that Asian and Black firms are significantly more likely to organize as  
C-corporations, which, by definition, cannot switch to less-complex LFOs. 
  The only other owner characteristic that is statistically significant is Change Ownership, 
the percentage change in the ownership share of the primary owner, which is positive. The odds 
ratio indicates that a one percentage point increase in ownership increases the likelihood of 
changing to a more complex LFO by about two percent. 
5.63 Industrial Classification and the Decision to Change to a More Complex LFO 
  Finally, in Panel C of Table 7 are the results for the industry dummies. Coefficients on 
four of the dummies—Transportation, Business Services, Health Services and Arts &   - 41 - 
Entertainment—are statistically significant at the 0.10 level and all are negative except for 
Health Services. Because of the small sample sizes when broken down by industry, the odds 
ratios for these variables are extremely large in magnitudes, but indicate that a firm changing 
LFO and in Transportation, Business Services or Arts & Entertainment is much less likely, while 
a firm in Health Services is much more likely, to choose a more complex LFO than is a firm in 
the omitted category of Retail. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
  In this study, we have sought to provide answers to three fundamental questions. First, 
why do entrepreneurial firms, at start-up, choose one legal form of organization over another? 
Second, after startup, when and why do entrepreneurial firms change legal form of organization, 
switching, for example, from proprietorship to partnership, LLC or corporation? Third, do firms 
grow more quickly under one legal form of organization than another? Until now, these three 
fundamental questions about entrepreneurial firms have largely gone unanswered. 
  Surprisingly, our analysis reveals that a firm’s choice of LFO is largely set in stone at 
inception, at least for its first four years in operation. Only about one in three firms begins its life 
as a proprietorship, while almost as many begin as limited-liability companies (“LLCs”) and as 
corporations. Moreover, this distribution is remarkably stable over the first four years of a firm’s 
life. Fewer than one in ten firms changes LFO during these first four years, but those that do 
disproportionately move to a more complex form, primarily from proprietorship to a form with 
limited liability. In general, these findings do not support the life-cycle theory of the firm, except 
for those firms that do change LFO during their first four years; however, four years may be too   - 42 - 
short of a time frame to observe the life cycle in practice. Alternatively, the firm may discover 
after start-up that it is simply too costly to change LFO. 
  Our analysis of the firm’s initial choice of LFO reveals that a firm is more likely to 
choose a more complex LFO when the firm is more complex as proxied by employment size, by 
offering more complex employee benefit plans, and by offering trade credit. A more complex 
initial LFO also is more likely when the firm is more highly levered and when its primary owner 
is more educated; but is less likely when the firm is more profitable, has more tangible assets, 
uses personal loans for firm financing and when its primary owner is female. 
Our analysis of the decision to change LFO finds that firms initially organized as LLCs 
or S-corporations are less likely, while Partnerships are more likely, to change LFO than are 
Proprietorships or C-corporations. Firms that increase employment or change location between a 
residence and rented/ purchased space, are more likely to change LFO, as are smaller and more 
profitable firms. Firms that experience a change in the number of owners (up or down), a 
decrease in the ownership of the primary owner or a change in industrial classification are more 
likely to change LFO.  
For those firms that do change LFO, this decision is primarily driven by changes in 
ownership structure. The choice of a more complex LFO is more likely when the firm has 
changed location, experienced an increase in the number of owners or the ownership share of the 
primary owner, but is less likely when the firm has experienced a decrease in the number of 
owners. Our analysis of the decision to change LFO finds that faster growing firms (in terms of 
employment) are more likely to change LFO.    - 43 - 
Finally, our analysis of firm growth indicates that firms with more complex LFOs 
experience greater growth in terms of employment; Proprietorships grow the slowest while C-
corporations grow the fastest—at roughly double the rate of Proprietorships. 
  This study make several important contributions to the literature on entrepreneurship by 
providing new empirical evidence on: (i) a firm’s initial choice of LFO at start-up; (ii) the 
determinants of a firm’s initial choice of LFO; (iii) the incidence of changes in LFO during the 
start-years of a new firm; (iv) the determinant of changes in LFO during the start-up years of a 
new firm; and (v) differences in growth across organizational forms. 
  From a policy perspective, this new evidence will provide policymakers with a roadmap 
by which they can encourage the transition of firms to organizational forms that are more 
conducive to growth and complexity. By targeting such policies towards high-tech firms, for 
example, policymakers can encourage such transitions in particular industries, or at firms with 
particular attributes, such as a small number of employees or at particular LFOs, such as 
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Appendix Table 1: 
Changes in Legal Form of Organization (LFO) 
This table presents a cross-tabulation by legal form of organization (LFO) at startup and in the first year of the 
firm’s operation for firms that changed LFO from startup to year one. PROP indicates a proprietorship; LLC 
indicates a limited-liability company; SCORP indicates an S-corporation; CCORP indicates a C-corporation; and 
PART indicates a (general or limited) partnership. “t=0” indicates the startup year while “t=1” indicates the first 
year of operation. 
Panel A: Initial Survey to First Follow-Up 
Frequency
Percent
Row Pct PROP(t=1) LLC(t=1) SCORP(t=1) CCORP(t=1) PART(t=1)
Col Pct 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 0 20 25 11 7 63
PROP(t=0) 0 13.51 16.89 7.43 4.73 42.57
0 31.75 39.68 17.46 11.11
0 66.67 37.88 47.83 77.78
2 5 0 11 4 1 21
LLC(t=0) 3.38 0 7.43 2.7 0.68 14.19
23.81 0 52.38 19.05 4.76
25 0 16.67 17.39 11.11
3 3 3 0 6 1 13
SCORP(t=0) 2.03 2.03 0 4.05 0.68 8.78
23.08 23.08 0 46.15 7.69
15 10 0 26.09 11.11
4 2 1 23 0 0 26
CCORP(t=0) 1.35 0.68 15.54 0 0 17.57
7.69 3.85 88.46 0 0
10 3.33 34.85 0 0
5 10 6 7 2 0 25
PART(t=0) 6.76 4.05 4.73 1.35 0 16.89
40 24 28 8 0
50 20 10.61 8.7 0
Total 20 30 66 23 9 148
13.51 20.27 44.59 15.54 6.08 100
LFO(t=0) x LFO(t=1)
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Appendix Table 1 (cont.): 
Changes in Legal Form of Organization (LFO) 
This table presents a cross-tabulation by legal form of organization (LFO) in the first and second years of the firm’s 
operation for firms that changed LFO from year one to year two. PROP indicates a proprietorship; LLC indicates a 
limited-liability  company;  SCORP  indicates  an  S-corporation;  CCORP  indicates  a  C-corporation;  and  PART 
indicates a (general or limited) partnership. “t=1” indicates the first year of operation while “t=2” indicates the 
second year of operation. 
Panel B: First Follow-up to Second Follow-Up 
Frequency
Percent
Row Pct PROP(t=2) LLC(t=2) SCORP(t=2) CCORP(t=2) PART(t=2)
Col Pct 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 0 24 13 5 6 48
PROP(t=1) 0 22.22 12.04 4.63 5.56 44.44
0 50 27.08 10.42 12.5
0 68.57 34.21 27.78 66.67
2 4 0 13 5 2 24
LLC(t=1) 3.7 0 12.04 4.63 1.85 22.22
16.67 0 54.17 20.83 8.33
50 0 34.21 27.78 22.22
3 2 5 0 8 0 15
SCORP(t=1) 1.85 4.63 0 7.41 0 13.89
13.33 33.33 0 53.33 0
25 14.29 0 44.44 0
4 0 3 7 0 1 11
CCORP(t=1) 0 2.78 6.48 0 0.93 10.19
0 27.27 63.64 0 9.09
0 8.57 18.42 0 11.11
5 2 3 5 0 0 10
PART(t=1) 1.85 2.78 4.63 0 0 9.26
20 30 50 0 0
25 8.57 13.16 0 0
Total 8 35 38 18 9 108
7.41 32.41 35.19 16.67 8.33 100
LFO(t=1) x LFO(t=2)
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Appendix Table 1 (cont.): 
Changes in Legal Form of Organization (LFO) 
This table presents a cross-tabulation by legal form of organization (LFO) in the second and third years of the firm’s 
operation for firms that changed LFO from year two to year three. PROP indicates a proprietorship; LLC indicates a 
limited-liability  company;  SCORP  indicates  an  S-corporation;  CCORP  indicates  a  C-corporation;  and  PART 
indicates a (general or limited) partnership. “t=2” indicates the second year of operation while “t=3” indicates the 
third year of operation. 
Panel C: Second Follow-up to Third Follow-Up 
Frequency
Percent
Row Pct PROP(t=3) LLC(t=3) SCORP(t=3) CCORP(t=3) PART(t=3)
Col Pct 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 0 13 11 4 2 30
PROP(t=2) 0 19.12 16.18 5.88 2.94 44.12
0 43.33 36.67 13.33 6.67
0 72.22 39.29 36.36 66.67
2 2 0 9 2 1 14
LLC(t=2) 2.94 0 13.24 2.94 1.47 20.59
14.29 0 64.29 14.29 7.14
25 0 32.14 18.18 33.33
3 0 1 0 5 0 6
SCORP(t=2) 0 1.47 0 7.35 0 8.82
0 16.67 0 83.33 0
0 5.56 0 45.45 0
4 1 0 5 0 0 6
CCORP(t=2) 1.47 0 7.35 0 0 8.82
16.67 0 83.33 0 0
12.5 0 17.86 0 0
5 5 4 3 0 0 12
PART(t=2) 7.35 5.88 4.41 0 0 17.65
41.67 33.33 25 0 0
62.5 22.22 10.71 0 0
Total 8 18 28 11 3 68
11.76 26.47 41.18 16.18 4.41 100
LFO(t=2) x LFO(t=3)  - 50 - 
Appendix Table 1 (cont.): 
Changes in Legal Form of Organization 
This table presents a cross-tabulation by legal form of organization (LFO) in the third and fourth years of the firm’s 
operation for firms that changed LFO from year three to year four. PROP indicates a proprietorship; LLC indicates a 
limited-liability  company;  SCORP  indicates  an  S-corporation;  CCORP  indicates  a  C-corporation;  and  PART 
indicates a (general or limited) partnership. “t=3” indicates the third year of operation while “t=4” indicates the 
fourth year of operation. 
Panel D: Third Follow-up to Fourth Follow-Up 
Frequency
Percent
Row Pct PROP(t=4) LLC(t=4) SCORP(t=4) CCORP(t=4) PART(t=4)
Col Pct 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 0 11 5 1 0 17
PROP(t=3) 0 19.3 8.77 1.75 0 29.82
0 64.71 29.41 5.88 0
0 57.89 31.25 14.29 .
2 8 0 5 2 0 15
LLC(t=3) 14.04 0 8.77 3.51 0 26.32
53.33 0 33.33 13.33 0
53.33 0 31.25 28.57 .
3 3 5 0 4 0 12
SCORP(t=3) 5.26 8.77 0 7.02 0 21.05
25 41.67 0 33.33 0
20 26.32 0 57.14 .
4 0 2 6 0 0 8
CCORP(t=3) 0 3.51 10.53 0 0 14.04
0 25 75 0 0
0 10.53 37.5 0 .
5 4 1 0 0 0 5
PART(t=3) 7.02 1.75 0 0 0 8.77
80 20 0 0 0
26.67 5.26 0 0 .
Total 15 19 16 7 0 57
26.32 33.33 28.07 12.28 0 100
LFO(t=3) x LFO(t=4)
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Appendix Table 2: 
Definition of Analysis Variables 
 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
Variable Definition
Firm Characteristics
Total Employment Firm's total employment
Assets Firm's total assets in ranges
Profit/Loss Firm' profit or loss in ranges (profit positive, loss negative)
Sales Positive Firm's sales revenues are positive
Cash Firm's assets include cash
Accounts Receivable Firm's assets include accounts receivable
Inventory Firm's assets include inventory
Equipment Firm's assets include equipment
Vehicle Firm's assets include vehicle(s)
Land/Bldg. Firm's assets include land/building
Other Assets Firm's assets include other assets such as intangibles
Total Liabilities Firm's total liability in ranges
Personal Loan Firm's owner took out personal loan to finance the firm
Location in Residence Firm is located in a residence such as a house or garage
Health Plan Firm offers a health plan to full-time employees
Retirement Plan Firm offers a retirement plan to full-time employees
 
Panel B: Owner Characteristics 
Variable Definition
Owner Characteristics
Number of Owners Number of Owners
Experience Experience (in years) of primary owner
Age Age of primary owner
Male Primary owner is male
Female Primary owner is female
Asian Primary owner is Asian
Black Primary owner is Black
Hispanic Primary owner is Hispanic
Other Race Primary owner is other than white, Asian or Black
White Primary owner is white
Educ.- High School Primary owner holds a high-school degree or less
Educ. - Some College Primary owner attended some college
Educ. - College Degree Primary owner holds a college degree
Educ. - Graduate Degree Primary owner holds a graduate degree
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Table 1 
Distribution of KFS Firms by Legal Form of Organization (LFO) 
Initial Survey and First Four Follow-up Surveys 
This table presents the distribution of KFS firms by legal form of organization at startup and for each of its first four 
years in operation. Prop indicates a proprietorship; LLC indicates a limited-liability company; SCORP indicates an 
S-corporation;  CCORP  indicates  a  C-corporation;  GPART  indicates  a  general  partnership;  LPART  indicates  a 
limited partnership; and OTHER indicates any other entity. Panel A presents the weighted percentage distributions; 
Panel B presents the distribution by numbers of firms; and Panel C presents the unweighted percentage distribution. 
 
Initial Follow-up 1 Follow-up 2 Follow-up 3 Follow-up 4
 
PROP 1 35.76 34.31 33.09 33.27 33.63
LLC 2 30.50 31.24 32.08 30.99 31.98
SCORP 3 20.14 21.34 22.24 23.58 23.30
CCORP 4 7.94 7.62 7.56 6.88 6.57
GPART 5 3.87 3.53 3.29 3.39 2.90
LPART 6 1.59 1.64 1.63 1.84 1.56
OTHER 7 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.06
Initial Follow-up 1 Follow-up 2 Follow-up 3 Follow-up 4
PROP 1 1,635              1,272             1,052             911                813
LLC 2 1,557              1,305             1,158             972                866
SCORP 3 1,040              898                817                731                648
CCORP 4 441                 333                291                235                207
GPART 5 170                 123                96                  75                  63
LPART 6 74                   61                  50                  42                  32
OTHER 7 11                   6                    5                    5                    5
 
Total 4,928              3,998             3,469             2,971             2,634            
Initial Follow-up 1 Follow-up 2 Follow-up 3 Follow-up 4
PROP 1 33.18 31.82 30.33 30.66 30.63
LLC 2 31.59 32.64 33.38 32.72 33.38
SCORP 3 21.10 22.46 23.55 24.60 24.42
CCORP 4 8.95 8.33 8.39 7.91 7.80
GPART 5 3.45 3.08 2.77 2.52 2.37
LPART 6 1.50 1.53 1.44 1.41 1.21
OTHER 7 0.22 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.19
Panel C:
Unweighted Percentages of KFS Firms by Legal Form of Organization
Weighted Distribution of KFS Firms by Legal Form of Organization
Panel A:
Panel B:
Number of KFS Firms by Legal Form of Organization
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Table 2: 
Changes in Legal Form of Organization 
This table presents a cross-tabulation by legal form of organization (LFO) for firms that changed LFO any time 
during  their  first  four  years  of  operation..  PROP  indicates  a  proprietorship;  LLC  indicates  a  limited-liability 
company; SCORP indicates an S-corporation; CCORP indicates a C-corporation; and PART indicates a (general or 




Row Pct PROP(t=F) LLC(t=F) SCORP(t=F) CCORP(t=F) PART(t=F)
Col Pct 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 0 68 54 21 15 158
PROP(t=I) 0 17.85 14.17 5.51 3.94 41.47
0 43.04 34.18 13.29 9.49  
0 66.67 36.49 35.59 71.43
2 19 0 38 13 4 74
LLC(t=I) 4.99 0 9.97 3.41 1.05 19.42
25.68 0 51.35 17.57 5.41
37.25 0 25.68 22.03 19.05
3 8 14 0 23 1 46
SCORP(t=I) 2.10 3.67 0 6.04 0.26 12.07
17.39 30.43 0 50.00 2.17
15.69 13.73 0 38.98 4.76
4 3 6 41 0 1 51
CCORP(t=I) 0.79 1.57 10.76 0 0.26 13.39
5.88 11.76 80.39 0 1.96
5.88 5.88 27.70 0 4.76
5 21 14 15 2 0 52
PART(t=I) 5.51 3.67 3.94 0.52 0 13.65
40.38 26.92 28.85 3.85 0
41.18 13.73 10.14 3.39 0
Total 51 102 148 59 21 381
13.39 26.77 38.85 15.49 5.51 100    - 54 - 
Table 3: 
Descriptive Statistics by Legal Form of Organization 
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used to explain the firm choice of legal form of organization 
and subsequent changes in legal form of organization. Variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. For each variable 
in column one and each organizational form in row one, the table presents the mean over the standard error. PROP 
indicates a proprietorship; LLC indicates a limited-liability company; SCORP indicates an S-corporation; CCORP 
indicates a C-corporation; and PART indicates a (general or limited) partnership. 
 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
Variable ALL PROP PART LLC SCORP CCORP
4,914          1,634          244             1,556          1,039          441            
Total Employment 1.655 0.662 1.596 1.803 2.696 2.954
(Number) 0.053 0.040 0.264 0.098 0.145 0.235
Assets 5.255 4.612 5.139 5.591 5.836 5.469
(Range) 0.038 0.066 0.186 0.067 0.076 0.130
Profit/Loss -0.680 -0.118 -0.899 -1.018 -0.730 -1.635
(Range) 0.068 0.112 0.299 0.123 0.156 0.215
Sales Positive 0.808 0.838 0.849 0.791 0.814 0.691
(Yes/No) 0.006 0.009 0.024 0.010 0.012 0.021
Cash 0.673 0.592 0.709 0.728 0.730 0.661
(Yes/No) 0.007 0.013 0.031 0.011 0.013 0.021
Inventory 0.391 0.422 0.473 0.357 0.377 0.359
(Yes/No) 0.007 0.013 0.034 0.012 0.015 0.022
Accounts Receivable 0.378 0.272 0.386 0.397 0.513 0.431
(Yes/No) 0.007 0.011 0.033 0.012 0.015 0.022
Equipment 0.674 0.678 0.627 0.663 0.708 0.642
(Yes/No) 0.007 0.012 0.033 0.012 0.014 0.022
Vehicle 0.250 0.260 0.207 0.229 0.280 0.238
(Yes/No) 0.006 0.011 0.027 0.010 0.014 0.019
Land/Bldg 0.098 0.078 0.124 0.138 0.077 0.069
(Yes/No) 0.004 0.007 0.022 0.009 0.008 0.011
Other Assets 0.019 0.008 0.007 0.024 0.026 0.040
(Yes/No) 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.009
Total Liabilities 1.324 0.661 1.098 1.468 1.978 2.251
(Range) 0.035 0.044 0.145 0.063 0.084 0.134
Personal Loan 0.572 0.594 0.487 0.574 0.582 0.500
(Yes/No) 0.007 0.013 0.034 0.012 0.015 0.022
Location in Residence 0.491 0.626 0.420 0.464 0.367 0.347
(Yes/No) 0.007 0.012 0.033 0.012 0.015 0.021
Health Plan 0.139 0.048 0.163 0.161 0.240 0.193
(Yes/No) 0.005 0.005 0.025 0.009 0.013 0.018
Retirement Plan 0.046 0.008 0.058 0.055 0.084 0.082
(Yes/No) 0.003 0.002 0.016 0.006 0.008 0.012  
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Table 3 (cont.): 
Descriptive Statistics by Legal Form of Organization 
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used to explain the firm choice of legal form of organization 
and subsequent changes in legal form of organization. Variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. For each variable 
in column one and each organizational form in row one, the table presents the mean over the standard error. PROP 
indicates a proprietorship; LLC indicates a limited-liability company; SCORP indicates an S-corporation; CCORP 
indicates a C-corporation; and PART indicates a (general or limited) partnership. 
 
Panel B: Owner Characteristics 
Variable ALL PROP PART LLC SCORP CCORP
 
Number of Owners 1.692 1.000 2.466 2.005 1.745 2.938
(Number) 0.042 0.000 0.129 0.051 0.037 0.402
Age 3.501 3.464 3.553 3.551 3.453 3.561
(Range) 0.016 0.029 0.084 0.027 0.031 0.051
Experience 11.705 11.058 11.282 12.071 12.221 12.196
(Years) 0.147 0.264 0.736 0.259 0.300 0.473
Male 0.685 0.623 0.614 0.724 0.728 0.752
(Yes/No) 0.007 0.012 0.033 0.011 0.013 0.019
Female 0.314 0.376 0.386 0.274 0.270 0.247
(Yes/No) 0.007 0.012 0.033 0.011 0.013 0.019
Asian 0.040 0.030 0.048 0.034 0.054 0.074
(Yes/No) 0.003 0.004 0.014 0.004 0.007 0.012
Black 0.092 0.110 0.087 0.080 0.053 0.155
(Yes/No) 0.004 0.008 0.019 0.007 0.007 0.016
Hispanic 0.063 0.082 0.036 0.045 0.056 0.087
(Yes/No) 0.003 0.007 0.012 0.005 0.007 0.013
White 0.822 0.796 0.835 0.852 0.856 0.732
(Yes/No) 0.005 0.010 0.025 0.009 0.011 0.020
Other Race 0.053 0.070 0.051 0.038 0.045 0.052
(Yes/No) 0.003 0.007 0.015 0.005 0.006 0.010
Educ. - High School 0.210 0.286 0.318 0.155 0.151 0.158
(Yes/No) 0.006 0.012 0.031 0.009 0.011 0.016
Educ. - Some College 0.310 0.344 0.335 0.267 0.301 0.333
(Yes/No) 0.007 0.012 0.032 0.011 0.014 0.021
Educ. - B.A. Degree 0.239 0.201 0.173 0.279 0.283 0.190
(Yes/No) 0.006 0.010 0.025 0.011 0.014 0.018
Educ. - Grad Degree 0.238 0.168 0.169 0.297 0.261 0.318
(Yes/No) 0.006 0.010 0.025 0.011 0.013 0.021
Education 1.506 1.251 1.194 1.720 1.656 1.668
(Range) 0.015 0.027 0.072 0.026 0.031 0.049  
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Table 3: 
Descriptive Statistics by Legal Form of Organization 
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used to explain the firm choice of legal form of organization 
and subsequent changes in legal form of organization. Variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. For each variable 
and each organizational form, the table presents the mean over the standard error. PROP indicates a proprietorship; 
LLC indicates a limited-liability company; SCORP indicates an S-corporation; CCORP indicates a C-corporation; 
and  PART  indicates  a  (general  or  limited)  partnership.  NAICS10  includes  Agriculture;  NAICS20  includes 
Construction;  NAICS30  includes  Manufacturing;  NAICS40  includes  Wholesale  and  Retail  Trade;  NAICS50 
includes  Professional  Services;  NAICS60  includes  Educational  and  Health-Care  Services;  NAICS70  includes 
Entertainment, Accommodation and Food Services; and NAICS80 includes Business and Personal Services.  
 
Panel C: Industrial Classification 
Variable ALL PROP PART LLC SCORP CCORP
 
Agriculture 0.010 0.008 0.018 0.015 0.005 0.003
(NAICS 10) 0.001 0.002 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.003
Construction 0.115 0.107 0.076 0.116 0.143 0.101
(NAICS 21, 22, 23) 0.005 0.008 0.018 0.008 0.011 0.013
Manufacturing 0.063 0.063 0.055 0.058 0.058 0.095
(NAICS 31, 32, 33) 0.003 0.006 0.015 0.006 0.007 0.013
Wholesale Trade 0.056 0.048 0.030 0.056 0.066 0.081
(NAICS 42) 0.003 0.005 0.012 0.006 0.008 0.012
Retail Trade 0.145 0.164 0.199 0.119 0.146 0.121
(NAICS 44, 45) 0.005 0.010 0.027 0.008 0.011 0.015
Transportation 0.029 0.032 0.034 0.018 0.030 0.056
(NAICS 48, 49) 0.002 0.004 0.012 0.003 0.005 0.010
Information Svcs. 0.031 0.036 0.030 0.026 0.034 0.025
(NAICS 51) 0.002 0.005 0.011 0.004 0.005 0.007
Finance 0.053 0.023 0.080 0.074 0.065 0.062
(NAICS 52) 0.003 0.004 0.018 0.007 0.007 0.011
Real Estate 0.050 0.032 0.049 0.077 0.049 0.037
(NAICS 53) 0.003 0.004 0.015 0.007 0.007 0.009
Prof. Svcs. 0.171 0.164 0.127 0.185 0.173 0.167
(NAICS 54, 55, 61) 0.005 0.010 0.022 0.010 0.011 0.017
Bus. Svcs. 0.099 0.099 0.080 0.098 0.096 0.121
(NAICS 56) 0.004 0.008 0.018 0.007 0.009 0.015
Health Svcs. 0.033 0.036 0.029 0.026 0.037 0.037
(NAICS 62) 0.003 0.005 0.011 0.004 0.006 0.008
Arts & Entertainment 0.024 0.023 0.032 0.031 0.019 0.009
(NAICS 71) 0.002 0.004 0.012 0.004 0.004 0.004
Food Svcs. 0.026 0.015 0.034 0.037 0.027 0.031
(NAICS 72) 0.002 0.003 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.008
Other Svcs. 0.095 0.150 0.127 0.064 0.053 0.054
(NAICS 81) 0.004 0.009 0.022 0.006 0.007 0.010  
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Table 4: 
Determinants of Initial LFO 
This table presents the results from estimating a multinomial logistic regression model of the firm’s choice of legal form of organization (“LFO”) at startup. 
Explanatory variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. For each explanatory variable and each legal form of organization, the table presents the odds ratio, the 
coefficient estimate and the t-statistic associated with the coefficient estimate. This methodology produces (N – 1) coefficients for each explanatory variable, 
where N  is the  number of different values of  the dependent  variable—in our case N  is equal to  five (proprietorship, partnership,  LLC, S-corporation or 
C-corporation, so we obtain four sets of coefficients. These coefficients measure the differential impact of that variable on each of the N – 1 outcomes of the 
dependent variable relative to an omitted category. For ease of interpretation, we have chosen the simplest form of legal organization—proprietorship—as the 
omitted  category.  Consequently,  the  coefficients  indicate  whether  each  of  the  other  four  LFOs  is  more  or  less  likely  to  have  that  characteristic  than  a 
proprietorship. For ease of interpretation, we also have calculated the odds ratio, whose interpretation is the percentage by which one LFO is more or less likely 
than Proprietorship for a given variable. 
a, 
b indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
Variable Odds Coef. t-stat. Odds Coef. t-stat. Odds Coef. t-stat. Odds Coef. t-stat.
Total Employment 1.11 0.104 3.69 a 1.12 0.110 5.31 a 1.15 0.142 6.73 a 1.17 0.157 6.86 a
Profit/Loss 0.95 -0.051 -3.38 a 0.95 -0.054 -6.22 a 0.96 -0.042 -4.44 a 0.93 -0.069 -5.23 a
Sales is Positive 0.88 -0.128 -0.65 0.58 -0.551 -5.35 a 0.48 -0.724 -6.06 a 0.30 -1.210 -8.07 a
Accounts Receivable 1.62 0.484 3.12 a 1.49 0.398 4.43 a 1.99 0.686 6.79 a 1.61 0.475 3.27 a
Other Assets 0.86 -0.154 -0.20 1.97 0.679 2.01 b 2.02 0.701 1.90 3.06 1.120 2.69 a
Location in Residence 0.56 -0.583 -3.93 a 0.59 -0.524 -6.25 a 0.44 -0.812 -8.41 a 0.39 -0.952 -7.06 a
Total Liabilities 1.05 0.044 1.27 1.12 0.113 5.49 a 1.14 0.131 6.04 a 1.21 0.191 7.03 a
Personal Loans 0.55 -0.591 -4.27 a 0.82 -0.202 -2.56 b 0.83 -0.191 -2.11 b 0.60 -0.507 -4.11 a
Health Plan 2.10 0.740 3.22 a 1.78 0.578 3.82 a 2.08 0.734 4.67 a 1.45 0.370 1.77
Retirement Plan 4.22 1.441 3.56 a 2.97 1.089 3.51 a 3.38 1.217 3.85 a 3.63 1.289 3.55 a
Partnership LLC S-Corporation C-Corporation
 
Panel B: Owner Characteristics 
Variable Odds Coef. t-stat. Odds Coef. t-stat. Odds Coef. t-stat. Odds Coef. t-stat.
Age 1.06 0.060 0.94 0.98 -0.022 -0.60 0.91 -0.095 -2.22 b 1.02 0.021 0.36
Experience 1.00 -0.002 -0.29 1.00 0.005 1.20 1.01 0.005 1.06 1.00 0.003 0.45
Education 0.86 -0.151 -2.15 b 1.43 0.357 9.24 a 1.33 0.286 6.45 a 1.31 0.268 4.44 a
Female 1.18 0.167 1.16 0.75 -0.286 -3.38 a 0.82 -0.204 -2.08 b 0.70 -0.354 -2.53 b
Asian 1.46 0.375 1.12 0.80 -0.229 -1.06 1.32 0.274 1.26 2.28 0.825 3.13 a
Black 0.749 -0.289 -1.21 0.73 -0.311 -2.33 b 0.49 -0.706 -4.08 a 1.65 0.502 2.83 a
Hispanic 0.37 -0.986 -2.64 a 0.58 -0.538 -3.01 a 0.69 -0.368 -1.89 1.23 0.204 0.86
Other Race 1.09 0.082 0.25 0.62 -0.477 -2.43 b 0.61 -0.487 -2.22 b 0.66 -0.423 -1.45
Partnership LLC S-Corporation C-Corporation
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Table 4 (cont.): 
Determinants of Initial LFO 
This table presents the results from estimating a multinomial logistic regression model of the firm’s choice of legal form of organization (“LFO”) at startup. 
Explanatory variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. For each explanatory variable and each legal form of organization, the table presents the odds ratio, the 
coefficient estimate and the t-statistic associated with the coefficient estimate. This methodology produces (N – 1) coefficients for each explanatory variable, 
where N  is the  number of different values of  the dependent  variable—in our case N  is equal to  five (proprietorship, partnership,  LLC, S-corporation or 
C-corporation, so we obtain four sets of coefficients. These coefficients measure the differential impact of that variable on each of the N – 1 outcomes of the 
dependent variable relative to an omitted category. For ease of interpretation, we have chosen the simplest form of legal organization—proprietorship—as the 
omitted  category.  Consequently,  the  coefficients  indicate  whether  each  of  the  other  four  LFOs  is  more  or  less  likely  to  have  that  characteristic  than  a 
proprietorship. For ease of interpretation, we also have calculated the odds ratio, whose interpretation is the percentage by which one LFO is more or less likely 
than Proprietorship for a given variable. 
a, 
b indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
Panel C: Industrial Classification 
Variable Odds Coef. t-stat. Odds Coef. t-stat. Odds Coef. t-stat. Odds Coef. t-stat.
Construction 2.27 0.818 1.47 2.23 0.800 2.15 b 0.66 -0.419 -0.74 0.59 -0.528 -0.55
Manufacturing 0.76 -0.277 -0.92 2.14 0.760 4.78 a 2.22 0.797 4.57 a 2.06 0.725 2.80 a
Wholesale Trade 0.76 -0.281 -0.87 1.13 0.121 0.66 0.88 -0.123 -0.58 1.74 0.557 2.09 b
Retail Trade 0.55 -0.592 -1.46 1.49 0.402 2.07 b 1.38 0.322 1.51 2.06 0.725 2.59 a
Transportation 1.16 0.147 0.37 1.02 0.019 0.07 1.44 0.368 1.34 3.15 1.147 3.53 a
Information Services 0.96 -0.046 -0.11 1.04 0.038 0.16 1.13 0.118 0.45 0.99 -0.006 -0.01
Finance 3.96 1.375 4.32 a 4.42 1.487 6.80 a 3.64 1.293 5.36 a 3.88 1.355 4.25 a
Real Estate 2.02 0.704 2.01 b 4.52 1.509 7.53 a 2.72 1.001 4.23 a 2.63 0.967 2.78 a
Professional Services 0.90 -0.100 -0.40 1.50 0.402 2.82 a 1.27 0.239 1.49 1.56 0.447 1.94
Business Services 0.90 -0.101 -0.35 1.61 0.478 2.99 a 1.47 0.384 2.14 b 2.39 0.871 3.57 a
Health Services 0.76 -0.274 -0.65 0.83 -0.181 -0.73 0.96 -0.043 -0.16 1.21 0.194 0.54
Arts & Entertainment 1.41 0.347 0.83 1.95 0.669 2.68 a 1.05 0.047 0.15 0.65 -0.424 -0.72
Food Services 1.36 0.308 0.70 2.25 0.813 2.90 a 1.06 0.055 0.17 1.38 0.322 0.76
Other Services 0.76 -0.273 -1.12 0.73 -0.316 -1.96 b 0.52 -0.662 -3.40 a 0.68 -0.3924 -1.37
Partnership LLC S-Corporation C-Corporation  - 59 - 
Table 5: 
Descriptive Statistics for Employment Growth by Legal Form of Organization (LFO) 
This table presents descriptive statistics (means and standard errors) by legal form of organization (LFO) for the change in the number 
employees from the initial survey year (year 0) to the year of each of the four annual follow-up surveys (years 1 through 4).   
a, 
b indicate that the difference in the mean of each LFO (Partnership, LLC, S-corporation and C-corporation) and the mean of 
Proprietorship is statistically different from zero at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
 
Obs. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
Growth (0,1) 3,942     1.155 0.054 0.605 0.058 1.199 0.099 a 1.164 0.266 a 1.507 0.134 a 2.200 0.246 a
Growth (0,2) 3,416     1.512 0.068 0.790 0.074 1.600 0.124 a 1.565 0.318 a 2.049 0.175 a 2.560 0.304 a
Growth (0,3) 2,934     1.406 0.077 0.720 0.079 1.598 0.140 a 0.745 0.323 1.951 0.213 a 2.490 0.349 a
Growth (0,4) 2,635     1.471 0.086 0.676 0.087 1.676 0.162 a 1.203 0.343 a 2.020 0.230 a 2.801 0.404 a
C-corporation S-corporation All Firms Proprietorship Partnership LLC
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Table 6: 
Determinants of the Decision to Change LFO 
This table presents the results from estimating a binary logistic regression model of the firm’s decision to change 
LFO during one of its first four years in operation. The dependent variable takes on a value of one if the firm 
changed  LFO  during  the  first  four  years  and  a  value  of  zero  otherwise.  Explanatory  variables  are  defined  in 
Appendix Table 1. For each explanatory variable, the table presents the odds ratio, the coefficient estimate and its 
associated standard error and p-value. 
a, 
b indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Odds Ratio Coefficient S.E. t-Statistic
Partnership 1.551 0.439 0.270 1.63 c
LLC 0.266 -1.326 0.213 -6.22 a
S-corporation 0.173 -1.755 0.272 -6.44 a
C-corporation 0.696 -0.362 0.281 -1.29  
Change in Employment 1.043 0.042 0.016 2.60 a
Total Employment 0.932 -0.070 0.029 -2.39 b
Total Liabilities 1.050 0.049 0.033 1.50
Profit/Loss 1.041 0.040 0.016 2.59 a
Location Up 2.090 0.737 0.232 3.17 a
Location Down 1.656 0.504 0.286 1.77 c
New Intellectual 1.296 0.259 0.244 1.06  
Female 0.869 -0.141 0.169 -0.83
Asian 1.412 0.345 0.325 1.06
Black 1.064 0.062 0.261 0.24
Hispanic 0.612 -0.492 0.370 -1.33
Education 1.105 0.100 0.076 1.31
Age 0.804 -0.219 0.073 -3.00 a
Experience 1.006 0.006 0.008 0.76
Change % Ownership 0.990 -0.010 0.005 -2.11 b
More Owners 5.794 1.757 0.224 7.83 a
Less Owners 4.594 1.525 0.224 6.80 a
Change NAICS 1.805 0.591 0.209 2.83 a
Agriculture 1.970 0.678 0.546 1.24
Construction 1.736 0.551 0.283 1.95 c
Manufacturing 1.194 0.177 0.328 0.54
Wholesale Trade 1.341 0.294 0.365 0.80  
Transportation 0.978 -0.023 0.482 -0.05
Information Services 0.891 -0.115 0.502 -0.23
Finance 0.583 -0.539 0.458 -1.18
Real Estate 0.345 -1.065 0.570 -1.87 c
Professional Services 0.999 -0.001 0.268 -0.01
Business Services 0.901 -0.104 0.315 -0.33
Health Services 1.025 0.025 0.487 0.05
Arts & Entertainment 0.665 -0.408 0.594 -0.69
Food Services 1.833 0.606 0.539 1.12
Other Services 0.867 -0.143 0.313 -0.46
Panel A: Firm Characteristics
Panel B: Owner Characteristics
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Table 7: 
Determinants of the Decision to Change to a More Complex LFO 
This table presents the results from estimating a binary logistic regression model of the firm’s decision to change to 
a more-complex LFO during one of its first four years in operation, conditional upon deciding to change LFO during 
one of its first four years. The dependent variable takes on a value of one if the firm changed to a more-complex 
LFO during the first four years and a value of zero otherwise. Explanatory variables are defined in Appendix Table 
1. For each explanatory variable, the table presents the odds ratio, the coefficient estimate and its associated standard 
error and p-values. 
a, 
b indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Odds Ratio Coefficient S.E. t-Statistic
Firm Characteristics
Change in Employment 1.022 0.022 0.053 0.41
Total Employment 0.964 -0.037 0.099 -0.37
Total Liabilities 0.729 -0.316 0.094 -3.34 c
Profit/Loss 0.933 -0.069 0.041 -1.68 c
Health Plan 8.922 2.189 0.745 2.94 a
Retirement Plan 1.206 0.187 1.117 0.17
Location Up 11.779 2.466 0.904 2.73 a
Location Down 6.804 1.918 0.881 2.18 b
New Intellectual 0.379 -0.970 0.633 -1.53
Variable Odds Ratio Coefficient S.E. t-Statistic
Owner Characteristics
Female 0.872 -0.137 0.420 -0.33
Asian 0.193 -1.643 0.813 -2.02 b
Black 0.281 -1.271 0.686 -1.85 c
Education 0.918 -0.085 0.209 -0.41
Age 0.786 -0.241 0.180 -1.34  
Change % Ownership 1.018 0.018 0.011 1.71 c
More Owners 12.505 2.526 0.688 3.67 a
Less Owners 0.062 -2.778 0.582 -4.77 a
Variable Odds Ratio Coefficient S.E. t-Statistic
Industrial Classification
Chg. NAICS 0.997 -0.003 0.553 0.00
Construction 0.979 -0.022 0.703 -0.03
Manufacturing 0.957 -0.044 0.848 -0.05
Wholesale Trade 1.660 0.507 0.887 0.57
Transportation 0.142 -1.952 1.178 -1.66 c
Information Services 0.304 -1.191 1.318 -0.90
Finance 0.490 -0.713 1.113 -0.64
Professional Services 0.711 -0.341 0.664 -0.51
Business Services 0.078 -2.551 0.793 -3.22 a
Health Services 43.009 3.761 1.766 2.13
Arts & Entertainment 0.027 -3.630 2.043 -1.78 c
Food Services 0.234 -1.454 1.437 -1.01
Other Services 1.768 0.570 0.886 0.64
Panel C: Industrial Classification
Panel B: Owner Characteristics
Panel A: Firm Characteristics
 
 
 